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MORELAND COMMISSION

ON UTILITY STORM  
PREPARATION AND RESPONSE

REGINA CALCATERRA  
Executive Director

223 Store Hill Road  
Old Westbury, New York

December 11, 2012  
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PRECISE COURT REPORTING  
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1 A P P E A R A N C E S:

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3 MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION:

4 REGINA CALCATERRA

5 Executive Director

6 BENJAMIN LAWSKY, Co-Chair,

7 Superintendent of Financial Services, State of New York

8 ROBERT ABRAMS, Co-Chair, former Attorney General of the State of

9 New York

10 PETER BRADFORD, former Chairman, New York State

11 Public Service Commission (Not Present)

12 DAN TISHMAN, Vice Chairman,

13 AEOCOM Technology Corp. (Not Present)

14 KATHLEEN RICE, Nassau County District Attorney

15 REVEREND FLOYD FLAKE, Greater Allen AME Cathedral

16 JOANIE MAHONEY,

17 County Executive of Onondaga County (Not Present)

18 TONY COLLINS, President, Clarkson University

19 MARK GREEN, former Public Advocate, City of New York

20 JOHN DYSON, former chairman of the New York

21 Power Authority (Not Present)

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1 CO-CHAIR ABRAMS: Good evening. On behalf of my fellow  
2 commissioners, we'd like to begin the proceedings for tonight  
3 and, initially, give our profuse thanks to SUNY Old Westbury for  
4 their wonderful hospitality. We very much appreciate their  
5 giving us the opportunity to utilize these facilities and to  
6 welcome people from throughout Nassau County and, indeed, all  
7 Long Island to come to this public hearing and to be heard and  
8 testify with respect to a very important issue.  
9 I'll be introducing my colleagues in a few moments, and then  
10 we'll proceed with our speakers.

11 On November 13th of this year, 2012, our distinguished  
12 Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, signed an executive order that  
13 established a commission under the Moreland Act, and that is  
14 found in Section 6 of the New York State Executive Law, with the  
15 mandate to investigate the response, preparation, and management  
16 of New York's power utility companies with respect to several  
17 major storms that impacted New York State, not only this year,  
18 but over the past several years.

19 The commission has been charged with two related  
20 objectives. First, to formulate recommendations about how to  
21 best reform the current utility oversight structure here in New  
22 York, and to investigate the utility's response to the  
23 catastrophic storms that recently struck us here in New York.

24 The first objective has been assigned to a policy  
25 subcommittee. The subcommittee is chaired by Commissioner

1 Bradford, the former chair of the Public Service Commission here  
2 in New York State a number of years ago, and a professor at the  
3 law school in the University of Vermont. And he will be joined  
4 by Commissioners Dyson, Collins and Tishman serving on that  
5 subcommittee.

6 The policy committee is charged with examining the  
7 functions of the various energy agencies in the state, and  
8 determining if the public would be better served if they were  
9 reorganized or streamlined.

10 The committee will also be examining the monopoly-type  
11 structure of the investor-owned utilities, and whether there  
12 should be reforms going forward to insure that consumers are  
13 adequately served.

14 It will also be examining LIPA, the Long Island Power  
15 Authority, to determine whether there should be structural  
16 changes to its organization and its operation. This committee  
17 has begun its work and plans on providing recommendations to the  
18 full commission and then to the governor prior to the governor's  
19 State of the State Message which is in early January.

20 So, obviously, the commission has gotten a fast start, as  
21 has this subcommittee, and it has a very tough timetable to  
22 meet, but it is prepared to do that.

23 The second objective has been assigned to the investigatory  
24 subcommittee. It's being chaired by the distinguished District  
25 Attorney of Nassau County, Kathleen Rice, and Kathleen is joined

1 on that committee by Commissioners Flake, Mahoney and Green.  
2 The investigatory subcommittee will specifically be  
3 investigating the emergency preparedness and storm response of  
4 the utilities in all of the recent storms. This committee has  
5 also begun its work and DA Rice will provide us with insight  
6 into its progress in a few moments.

7 The commission has assigned staff to supplement each  
8 subcommittee in its efforts. The commission staff is a mix of  
9 talented professionals with experience in law, in energy,  
10 finance and public policy who are all working diligently in  
11 coordination with all members of the commission.

12 The commission expects to provide some preliminary findings  
13 and recommendations to the governor by the end of December, and  
14 will continue its work into the new year until the governor  
15 determines that its objectives are met.

16 We'll be holding additional public hearings in the coming  
17 weeks and, in fact, a week from tonight. The next hearing will  
18 be held on September 20th at which time commissioners will be  
19 given an opportunity to ask questions of the executives and key  
20 staff of LIPA and National Grid about their response to  
21 Hurricane Sandy.

22 The people of New York have suffered devastating losses as  
23 a result of Super Storm Sandy, dozens of lives have been lost,  
24 billions of dollars of damage has been sustained, homes have  
25 been ravaged, and families and personal lives have suffered

1 severe emotional and financial setbacks.

2 The public is entitled to a thorough investigation and  
3 analysis with accountability for any negligence or wrongdoing.  
4 The commission stands ready to act decisively in the public  
5 interest.

6 It's a personal honor for me to co-chair this commission  
7 with a very distinguished New Yorker, Superintendent Benjamin  
8 Lawsky, the superintendent of financial services. He's had an  
9 extraordinary record of public service up until his assignment  
10 to this post, and I'm pleased to introduce him at this moment.

11 CO-CHAIR LAWSKY: Thank you, Bob. First, let me just say,  
12 so there's no confusion, I believe our next hearing will be on  
13 LIPA next Thursday night. Next Thursday. Just so we have that.

14 Thank you to everyone who is here tonight. Thank you to  
15 the commissioners for attending. I want to specifically thank  
16 the witnesses who are here tonight and maybe most of all our  
17 Executive Director Regina Calcaterra and her staff who have  
18 thrown themselves into this project with total reckless abandon  
19 on a very tough timetable and are working extremely hard.

20 It's good to be here tonight because the work of this  
21 commission, as dictated by the governor is just incredibly  
22 important to New Yorkers and to Long Islanders. The human and  
23 economic toll that Storm Sandy had on our state has been immense  
24 and the devastation has been profound.

25 What happened here on Long Island was tragic and it was

1 unacceptable. And as we survey what went wrong in the  
2 preparation for and the response to the storm, the role played  
3 by the utility companies is obviously central. Our mission in  
4 grappling with what went wrong is, on the one hand, complicated,  
5 but in another way quite simple.

6 We really have three basic questions, what went wrong, how  
7 and why did it go wrong, and how do we go about fixing it. Now,  
8 as we answer those basic questions, we will need to look at many  
9 areas ranging from technology, is our grid sufficient to  
10 corporate structures and incentives, to communication failures  
11 on many levels, to the alphabet soup of agencies that regulate  
12 power and energy in New York, and even to mundane things like  
13 why didn't the utilities trim the trees near the power lines,  
14 and do we have enough electricians in this state who are  
15 licensed to help us when it's time to inspect homes to get the  
16 power back on.

17 Now how the utilities responded or failed to respond to the  
18 recent storms deserves an investigation that is aggressive,  
19 thoughtful, and fair. And it deserves an investigation that we  
20 will carry out in an efficient but not hurried manner. Most of  
21 all, it's an investigation that should put New Yorkers and New  
22 York consumers and New York power users first.

23 New Yorkers, Long Islanders, suffered incredibly after this  
24 storm and many are still suffering as we sit here tonight. Long  
25 Island and all of New York deserves answers and it's our job to

1 get those answers and to shine a bright spotlight on what went  
2 wrong, the failures that occurred and then to make  
3 recommendations to start to fix things.

4 I look forward to these hearings. We have very interesting  
5 witnesses here tonight, and, to the extent members of the public  
6 are here and want to speak their mind as well, that is what this  
7 commission is all about and we do want to hear from you as well,  
8 so thank you, Chairman Abrams.

9 CO-CHAIR ABRAMS: Thank you Superintendent Lawsky.

10 People of Nassau County, people around this state, but, in  
11 particular, people of Nassau County know about Kathleen Rice in  
12 her dedication to public service and her effective tenure as the  
13 District Attorney of Nassau County and the governor selected  
14 well in asking her to serve on this commission.

15 I'd like to ask her to give us a preliminary report about  
16 the work of the investigatory subcommittee.

17 MS. RICE: Thank you, Chairman Abrams. Thank you all for  
18 being here tonight. Like New York City and other downstate  
19 areas, our community here on Long Island was hit hard by Sandy.  
20 We all know that extreme weather may not be something our  
21 utilities and government can ever never fully prepare for, but  
22 we also know that utility infrastructure and regulatory  
23 apparatus must, at the very least, adopt best practices and seek  
24 to professionalize and prepare their systems for serving New  
25 Yorkers during and after severe weather.

1 I was asked to chair the investigative subcommittee of the  
2 commission and, to that end, this subcommittee has been very  
3 busy over the last three weeks. We have issued subpoenas to the  
4 power utilities. We have conducted many interviews. We will  
5 continue to do both of those things in an effort to prepare a  
6 thorough review of the power utilities emergency preparedness  
7 and storm response, not just to Sandy, but to storms over the  
8 past couple of years.

9 I agreed to serve on this commission for one reason, to  
10 hold people and systems accountable for what happened before and  
11 after the storm, and to insure that the utility failures that  
12 left so many New Yorkers vulnerable will never happen again.  
13 Thank you.

14 CO-CHAIR ABRAMS: We're pleased to have with us two  
15 additional members of the Moreland Commission and I'd like them  
16 to say a word.

17 First is the former New York City public advocate Mark  
18 Green.

19 MR. GREEN: Thank you, Chairman Abrams and Chairman Lawskey.  
20 I am really honored to have been among those selected by  
21 Governor Cuomo to the Moreland Utilities Commission. It is an  
22 important and powerful group of people under the 1907 Moreland  
23 Act. Not powerful enough to deter mother nature, but powerful  
24 enough to better anticipate and mitigate the effects of a  
25 natural calamity and a man-made disaster .

1 I'm not here, I suspect, although it's true, that I live in  
2 Manhattan, I grew up in Nassau, I have a home in Suffolk, but  
3 while I'm not a utilities regulator, I have been in New York  
4 City a consumer regulator, and one of the ethics I always  
5 brought to my work was that of prevention. It's much preferable  
6 to locate a guardrail at the top of a cliff than ambulances  
7 below. And so I look forward to being a part of the  
8 investigation and report to help the state when something like  
9 this happens again.

10 CO-CHAIR ABRAMS: Thank you very much. We'll now hear from  
11 an upstate participant in the Moreland Commission, Tony Collins,  
12 who is the president of the Clarkson University.

13 MR. COLLINS: Thank you. Just a little bit of background  
14 and some context, and you'll probably here an accent that's not  
15 Brooklyn or Boston, but I have been at Clarkson for over 30  
16 years. I was going to give you the exact number but I'll leave  
17 it at over 30, president for 10 years.

18 Clarkson is primarily engineering, and close to 4,000  
19 students. So we actually put a lot of people into the workforce  
20 in this area. So I hope to carry away from it information for  
21 higher education in terms of what we need in the future to  
22 renovate the systems, if that's required, to better manage them,  
23 and to recover from disasters perhaps even better.

24 So I appreciate the opportunity, as a side note, live in a  
25 region northern New York where a lot of power is produced and

1 transported down here by NYPA, so we have actually a close  
2 connection, in a sense, will play a role in the energy future of  
3 Long Island.

4 So I appreciate the opportunity to be here, listen, take in  
5 all this information. As I said, my focus will be to try to  
6 take the results of this into the workforce of the future.

7 CO-CHAIR ABRAMS: Thank you. I'm also pleased to see that  
8 Reverend Floyd Flake has joined us. Reverend Flake is a very  
9 distinguished member of our community. He spent many years in  
10 the United States Congress as a member of the house and he's a  
11 senior pastor of the Greater AME Cathedral in Queens.

12 REVEREND FLAKE: Thank you very much, chairman, and I'm  
13 happy to be here. I live about 15 minutes away, but I work a  
14 further distance, so that's the reason for my tardiness.

15 But living in the area, and living in Nassau County, one of  
16 the things that moved me to accept this invitation to join is  
17 the challenges that I see faced by so many people. So many  
18 people who really have no understanding of how the system works  
19 and, particularly, as it relates to the outage of power during  
20 the course of this particular storm and the storm on last year.

21 I do believe that we can do better. We must do better. I  
22 believe there are better resources available to us that maybe  
23 many of us have not known about. We'd like to know about those  
24 resources that will help us so that by the time of the next  
25 storm, by the time of its announcement, we would be in a

1 position ready to roll and to be able to change the condition.

2 As I saw the many light poles down and, of course, the many  
3 trees in my house, and the fact that I lived for two weeks in a  
4 house without any lights and lived in that house without any  
5 lights, to live in a house with the wife of 37 years without  
6 lights and gas is just not an easy thing. So I know some of you  
7 suffered as well as we did.

8 But my challenge really is one of trying to have a better  
9 understanding of how we get a grasp on the changing of the  
10 methodologies so that we might be able to be more efficient if  
11 this ever happens again.

12 Thank you very much and I look forward to hearing the  
13 testimony.

14 CO-CHAIR ABRAMS: Thank you very much, reverend.

15 The commission has been aided by a very able executive  
16 director who came to us on loan from the generous Suffolk County  
17 Executive, Regina Calcaterra is the Chief Deputy County  
18 Executive in Suffolk County. We are very fortunate to have had  
19 her come and help us get the ball rolling very very quickly, get  
20 us organized, helping to pull together the staff. I'm pleased  
21 to turn the proceedings over to here.

22 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you so much. Part  
23 of our procedure as we're going to go forward the next month and  
24 thereafter, as was mentioned earlier, we need to put together  
25 reports, which was discussed, and we also need to do an

1 investigation.

2 When we do both of them, before we come up with  
3 recommendations and before we come up with findings, we need to  
4 do our own fact finding. As DA Rice had mentioned, we're doing  
5 that through interviews with folks that we're bringing in.  
6 We're also doing it through subpoenas.

7 But another important way for us to do it is to ask for and  
8 invite public comment. So these public hearings, the one we had  
9 last week, the one we have tonight, is meant for that particular  
10 purpose and we wanted to reach two objectives with these public  
11 hearings.

12 We want to first invite those who had personal experience  
13 with the storm, who either managed a large municipal entity or  
14 managed critical infrastructure that was affected by Sandy, and  
15 also adversely affected by the utilities.

16 Also, of course, we also want to invite the public as well,  
17 and we understand that, you know, we have this hearing in the  
18 evening so those who work during the day would be able to make  
19 it, but we also have other opportunities as well for individuals  
20 to submit their testimony.

21 So this evening, individuals can testify before us tonight  
22 and speak to you about how set that forum up in a moment, but  
23 you can also submit testimony by going on line. Moreland has a  
24 website, Moreland.ny.gov and there's a link there, if you go to  
25 "comments," and can you submit your written testimony that way.

1           Also, if you can't stay this evening, we have in another  
2 room three stenographers that will gladly, either you can go  
3 hand in your testimony or if you want to give oral testimony,  
4 they will take your testimony as well, so it'll be accepted into  
5 the record.

6           The reason why we did that is because we wanted to make  
7 sure that we had the opportunity to hear from everyone who came  
8 this evening. We also understand, in order to do that, we need  
9 to set a limit on your opportunity to speak. So for those of  
10 you who came from the public who signed up to testify tonight,  
11 unfortunately we need to limit your opportunity to testify to  
12 two minutes, but if you're testimony's going to exceed two  
13 minutes and you want more on the record, we invite you to,  
14 thereafter, go to the room where the stenographers are, which is  
15 out the door to the left, and you can continue your oral  
16 testimony, that will be accepted in the record.

17           What we asked of the invited speakers and of the public is  
18 to focus your testimony on the points of the Moreland  
19 Commission. One aspect of the Moreland Commission is for us to  
20 come up with recommendations for the governor on restructuring  
21 state energy agencies, you know, if there's potential redundancy  
22 out there, or ways we can restructure or redefine these agencies  
23 to allow for efficiencies.

24           A second point that we ask that you consider commenting on,  
25 if you have the background is, how do we address the fact that

1 utilities are monopolies and we need incentives that are built  
2 in to continue serving their customers.

3 The third is, how do we restructure LIPA, what do we do  
4 with LIPA. That is our first mission that is due within the  
5 next few weeks. So we ask that you keep your comments either to  
6 one of those three points, or on our investigation because our  
7 investigation that's being headed up by DA Rice focuses either  
8 on the emergency preparedness or storm response of the  
9 utilities. So those are two other areas that you can touch  
10 upon.

11 But we assume that most individuals who joined us here this  
12 evening are going to touch upon at least one of those issues,  
13 but we hope that you narrow down your testimony that way so it  
14 will help us in our fact finding and help us in our  
15 determinations which we'll rolling out in the next month and  
16 thereafter.

17 So what we want to do first at the beginning of the program  
18 is actually invite our invited guests up to speak. The first  
19 one that is invited up to speak is Gil Quiniones who is  
20 president of the New York Power Authority, president and CEO of  
21 the New York Power Authority.

22 MR. QUINIONES: Good evening, Mr. Co-Chairman and members  
23 of the commission. I'm Gil Quiniones, the president and chief  
24 executive officer of the New York Power Authority, and I  
25 appreciate this opportunity to describe for you the Power

1 Authority's role in responding to the historic hurricane that  
2 struck our state on October 29th, along with sharing some of my  
3 own observations as part of the recovery effort.

4 The New York Power Authority or NYPA is the nation's  
5 largest state-owned electric utility and supplies about one  
6 quarter of New York State's electricity from our 17 generating  
7 plants and purchases from other sources.

8 The Power Authority also owns and operates more than 1,400  
9 circuit miles of transmission lines including about 1/3rd of all  
10 the high voltage transmission in the state. Thanks in large  
11 part to the efforts of NYPA's operations and emergency  
12 preparedness personnel, our generation and transmission  
13 facilities escaped largely unscathed during the storm.  
14 Virtually all had been available for service before the  
15 hurricane, and all of these continued to operate or remained  
16 available.

17 Moreover, we were able to furnish extensive and essential  
18 assistance to other power suppliers, notably the Long Island  
19 Power Authority and National Grid which operates the power  
20 system on Long Island for LIPA.

21 Governor Cuomo initially assigned me as his storm  
22 representative in Schorarie County, the location of NYPA's  
23 Blenheim-Gilboa Pumped Storage Power Project. But, as it  
24 happened, Hurricane Sandy's effects on the Schorarie Valley were  
25 less severe than forecasted. With essential New York situation

1 in hand, the governor then dispatched me on October 30 to New  
2 York City and Long Island where conditions, of course, were far  
3 different.

4 Some 30 of our upstate transmission linemen, heavy duty  
5 equipment operators and supervisors were quickly deployed to  
6 Long Island with bucket trucks and other equipment arriving very  
7 early in the recovery period. The NYPA workers and those we  
8 arranged to bring in from about 20 of our upstate municipal  
9 electric system, and rural cooperative customers, were among the  
10 first to arrive from the utilities off of Long Island. NYPA  
11 personnel remained through November 11th, assessing the  
12 condition of high voltage transmission lines and supporting LIPA  
13 and National Grid in restoring them to service.

14 Since NYPA does not own or operate low voltage distribution  
15 lines that directly serve customers, our transmission crews and  
16 equipment were deployed to work on the high voltage system.

17 In addition, we provided an interdepartmental group of NYPA  
18 engineers, project and construction managers, lawyers and  
19 communications and governmental affairs specialists to assist  
20 LIPA's and National Grid's recovery efforts.

21 We also supplied a comparable team to aid New York State  
22 Electric and Gas Corporation in the village of Brewster and  
23 other parts of its service territory in the lower Hudson Valley.

24 As these efforts proceeded, almost all of my time for two  
25 weeks was spent in National Grid's emergency operations center

1 on Long Island or in the governor's New York City office.

2 I was assigned two primary responsibilities during this  
3 period. First, to facilitate communications between the  
4 utilities and relevant state agencies and authorities. Second,  
5 to help in securing the resources needed to restore the power  
6 system to service. This task was particularly formidable on  
7 Long Island, where 90 percent of the customers lost power.

8 From these experiences, I would like to share my  
9 observations regarding challenges with workforce issues, system  
10 issues and communication issues during the recovery from this  
11 event.

12 The first issue I would like to discuss concerns assembling  
13 the necessary workers and then deploying them. Even while I was  
14 still in route from Blenheim-Gilboa to the downstate region, I  
15 learned of the severe shortage of line workers and tree trimmers  
16 on Long Island. With the concurrence of the governor's office,  
17 I began contacting our public power colleagues through national  
18 and state industry groups to secure additional crews to assist  
19 with the restoration. I also reached out to provincial  
20 utilities in Quebec and Ontario, Canada to urge them to send as  
21 many workers as possible to the Island.

22 We eventually assembled a public power assistance team that  
23 brought to Long Island more than 1,000 transmission line  
24 workers, tree trimmers and equipment operators from as far away  
25 as Seattle, Los Angeles, and Phoenix.

1 I also urged Kenneth Daly, president of National Grid New  
2 York, and Tom King, president of National Grid US, to  
3 immediately send crews from their upstate New York and New  
4 England utilities to Long Island. In addition, National Grid  
5 worked with the investor-owned utilities regional mutual aid  
6 organizations to bring workers to the Island.

7 With the number of mutual aid crews significantly  
8 increasing, the second workforce related issue I observed  
9 pertained to the deployment of those crews. Overall, the number  
10 of outside line workers and tree trimmers on Long Island surged  
11 to approximately 10,000. This created extraordinary challenges  
12 in housing them, feeding them, and coordinating their efforts.

13 An additional challenge arose with deployment of the  
14 workers once they were on the Island. The interdependency of  
15 electricity and fuel became very apparent, as multiple  
16 disruptions to the fuel supply chain into New York surfaced. I  
17 worked with the governor's office to help obtain fuel for LIPA  
18 and National Grid as well as other utilities.

19 The difficulties I have mentioned highlight the need to  
20 improve utilities' ability to handle the influx of mutual  
21 assistance crews once those resources are secured. In addition  
22 to these workforce-related challenges, a system related obstacle  
23 that should be addressed concerns the inability of LIPA and  
24 National Grid to know which parts of the service territory were  
25 ready for restoration and which were still too badly damaged or

1 flooded to send in work crews and equipment. In some cases,  
2 areas that had been designated as flooded contained non-flooded  
3 sectors in which electric service could, in fact, have been  
4 restored.

5 We worked with LIPA and National Grid to have county and  
6 local government officials report the current flooding status in  
7 their areas to utility employees at electric substations where  
8 restoration efforts were being planned and coordinated. This  
9 enabled prioritization of dispatch plans for field crews and the  
10 dedication of resources in a manner that would maximize their  
11 effectiveness.

12 We also asked LIPA to hire local inspectors and electrical  
13 contractors to survey areas that were generally flooded and to  
14 determine which homes and buildings had escaped severe damage  
15 and were able to be restored safely. Further, Governor Cuomo  
16 issued an executive order to expedite the hiring process for  
17 these surveyors by suspending normal contracting requirements  
18 for LIPA during the emergency.

19 While this effort was beneficial, long term solutions for  
20 the problem of assessing damage and identifying opportunities  
21 for service restoration should be evaluated. In particular, we  
22 must clearly define the responsibilities of utilities and county  
23 and local jurisdictions in arranging for and deploying surveyors  
24 following major events.

25 Assigning these tasks solely to local and county

1 governments, especially when they're facing a host of other  
2 resource and administrative challenges, clearly doesn't work.

3 The third and final area I want to address is  
4 communications. As has been widely reported, LIPA and National  
5 Grid did not adequately inform customers and local officials of  
6 how much damage had been sustained, where the damage occurred,  
7 and how severely the storm had impacted infrastructure.

8 The utilities also did not adequately communicate a clear  
9 road map for how repair of the grid and other problems were  
10 being addressed. There were many times when the information  
11 that was provided was inaccurate or out of date. And there were  
12 frequent inconsistencies in the information that the utilities  
13 conveyed through municipal conference calls, press updates,  
14 press releases, call centers, and the LIPA website.

15 Most importantly, LIPA and National Grid did not provide  
16 clear and accurate range estimates as to when service would be  
17 restored to specific towns and villages. Instead, the utilities  
18 worked only from a system-wide restoration number throughout the  
19 event.

20 With other utilities having encountered similar problems at  
21 various times during recovery from this and other storms, it is  
22 clear that the development of workable communication's plans  
23 must be a top priority.

24 I believe that the matters I have discussed this evening  
25 vividly demonstrate the importance and benefits of preparation,

1 communication, and cooperation. Beyond this, power suppliers  
2 must not only prepare for and respond to extreme weather events,  
3 but must also seek to limit the damage from such events by  
4 strengthening the power system.

5 As a co-chairman of Governor Cuomo's New York Energy  
6 Highway Task Force, I am pleased to report that all 13 actions  
7 recommended in the blueprint that was issued in October of this  
8 year will contribute to improving, strengthening and  
9 diversifying the energy system, and that all are moving ahead on  
10 schedule.

11 A key element of the energy highway blueprint calls for  
12 investing up to 800 million over the next five years in  
13 accelerated construction and repair projects that, among other  
14 benefits, will enhance the ability of the state's electric  
15 generation, transmission, and distribution systems to withstand  
16 severe storms. As part of this effort, the New York Power  
17 Authority staff will soon ask our board of trustees to approve a  
18 major life extension and modernization program for our  
19 transmission system.

20 In addition, NYPA will continue to identify areas in which  
21 we can further improve our emergency preparation and response  
22 capabilities and more effectively coordinate our activities with  
23 those of other public and private entities in New York State.

24 This concludes my prepared testimony and I'm now prepared  
25 to take your questions.

1 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you. Tony Collins.

2 MR. COLLINS: Mr. Quiniones, thank you very much. Just to  
3 dig a little deeper, when you said that you were on your way  
4 down and you were making phone calls to get more resources here,  
5 how does that work? How do you exchange workers between  
6 utilities, say from the west coast here, why the west coast and  
7 why not, say, Massachusetts? How does that work, and is there  
8 an exchange of resources, financial, and, therefore, is there an  
9 incentive or disincentive for you to call more people in?

10 MR. QUINIONES: There are what is called mutual assistance  
11 agreements regionally among investor-owned utilities. What  
12 happened during Sandy was that, because the storm was so large  
13 and big, many of the utilities, the investor-owned utilities  
14 from Florida all the way to Maine, held on to their crews  
15 because they wanted to see and be able to address damages that  
16 will happen in their own service territories before releasing  
17 their workers.

18 Investor-owned utilities serve about 70 percent of  
19 Americans. The other 30 percent are served by publicly owned  
20 utilities like the Power Authority, LIPA and others. On my way  
21 down from Schoharie County, I had a hunch that the  
22 investor-owned utility, mutual aid, was not completely  
23 coordinated with the public power side. So, what I did first  
24 was send our crews down here, called our customers. NYPA serves  
25 51 municipal and small cooperatives in New York State, called

1       them and asked them to send their crews and equipment down on  
2       Long Island.

3               Then I started calling the industry groups, we belong to  
4       national trade associations, the American Public Power  
5       Association, Large Public Power Council, and I called our  
6       colleagues from Canada, Hydra Quebec and Hydra One in the  
7       province of Ontario and asked them to send crews down to New  
8       York State. So it's through that process.

9               MR. COLLINS: Just a follow-up question. In that process,  
10       do you think this commission is, in a sense, looking inwardly to  
11       Long Island and within New York State, is there an issue in your  
12       mind at a national level in terms of getting the kind of help,  
13       and is that organized well enough so you feel can you get the  
14       resources you need under the circumstances?

15              MR. QUINIONES: I believe Sandy proved that the mutual aid  
16       process needs to be addressed nationally. First, to have a  
17       better integration between investor-owned utility, mutual aid  
18       agreements, as well as public power systems.

19              In Sandy, we ended up, as I've mentioned in my testimony,  
20       bringing in crews as far away from Los Angeles, southern  
21       California, Seattle and Phoenix because, again, most of the east  
22       coast investor-owned utilities held on to their crews.

23              EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Any other questions?  
24       Superintendent Lawsky.

25              CO-CHAIR LAWSKY: I don't mean this to be flip, but is it

1 a fairly obvious thing a company of any sort would do in terms  
2 of storm preparation, you're serving an area on the coast where  
3 storms are known to hit, that you would have -- you would have  
4 thought out ahead of time, what are we going to do if there's a  
5 big storm, whenever it may occur, do you have a plan to ensure  
6 that you're able to increase your capacity of workers, multiple  
7 times over, if not exponentially, and that you're able to have a  
8 system to manage those workers when they come in?

9 I mean, I know from the studying we've been doing on this  
10 commission, there is this concept of mutual aid. Everyone knows  
11 what it is, and it's how the power companies deal with a big  
12 storm.

13 Can you give us a sense, given your expertise and  
14 background, not only at NYPA but your prior expertise in the  
15 energy field, how big a failure was this? I mean, I run a  
16 relatively strong agency, and we have a disaster plan if  
17 something goes wrong, we know what we're going to do. And you  
18 would think a company that's answerable, you know, would be  
19 doing that. Can you give us a sense of that?

20 MR. GREEN: And can I put a PS to that because it's right  
21 on that point? You said how you were driving down and you had a  
22 hunch, your hunches are better than mine, but for days we had  
23 been warned that this large storm is coming up from the south,  
24 it's hitting the states, it's going to be near maybe like 1938,  
25 and so there was time prior to your drive perhaps to anticipate

1 something like that, or am I just -- is that just second  
2 guessing?

3 MR. QUINIONES: I think it is true that the utilities along  
4 the east coast held on to their workers. The question I have  
5 is, what about the mutual aid in the midwest and the mountain  
6 region in the west coast, what about the public power network  
7 that served 30 percent of all Americans? What about our friends  
8 from Canada from Ontario and Quebec? So that is I think a  
9 legitimate question to ask on how come -- it is understandable  
10 that the east coast utilities held on to their line workers and  
11 tree trimmers, but what about from the midwest all the way to  
12 the west coast and up to Canada.

13 CO-CHAIR ABRAMS: Mr. Quiniones, you indicated that there  
14 were some 10,000 employees, linemen and all kinds of employees  
15 of other power companies who came here, can you give us a better  
16 sense of how they were managed and directed? What happened?  
17 Who was giving them orders? Who is taking care of the direction  
18 of this tremendous influx of manpower?

19 MR. QUINIONES: They were received and managed by National  
20 Grid who operates the transmission and distribution system for  
21 LIPA. It is a big challenge. The 10,000 workers are line  
22 workers and tree trimmers. There were an additional 5,000 other  
23 workers who were support personnel and so I would say that the  
24 total workforce really was closer to 15,000. That's a big  
25 challenge.

1 I think it is important for this commission to look into  
2 the ability of National Grid, LIPA, and other utilities to  
3 receive such an influx of workers, to look at their supply  
4 chain, were they able to handle and manage their supply chain  
5 effectively and efficiently and also just being able to  
6 effectively deploy the various workers to where the jobs were  
7 during that restoration process.

8 CO-CHAIR ABRAMS: After the governor announced my  
9 appointment to this commission, I received phone calls from  
10 people who were telling me that here out in Long Island they saw  
11 vehicles, trucks, personnel just sitting around, not because  
12 they didn't want to be deployed, but I guess they were waiting  
13 for direction as to how they could effectively turn on the power  
14 and be of assistance to the people on Long Island.

15 Did you see that in your two-week stay here in Long Island?

16 MR. QUINIONES: I did receive reports of, you know, the  
17 difficulty of managing that influx of workforce. There were  
18 even instances which is, in some cases not unusual, but for the  
19 crews, some of the crews had to sleep in their trucks for two or  
20 three nights because there were not enough places to house them  
21 and to bed them when they came to Long Island.

22 So it is an area that I recommend, that the commission look  
23 into in terms of the effectiveness and efficiency of managing a  
24 sudden influx of workforce and, vis-a-vis, the supply chain and  
25 the materials management that are required to effectuate a

1 restoration of service.

2 REVEREND FLAKE: The extension of that question, I  
3 personally talked to a group from Little Rock, Arkansas. They  
4 were sitting beside the road. There was -- they did not know  
5 where to go, who to go to, or where to find the support system.  
6 So they were part of that group that was sitting beside the road  
7 asleep because, I mean, to think that they came this far to  
8 help, they did not get help because there was no one to tell  
9 them what to do, and I would suspect that that is because all of  
10 the systems were not quite connected in terms of an ability to  
11 be able to tell people where to go.

12 I just say it because I think that the next time, if we're  
13 going to deploy that many people into the region, then we must  
14 know where they're going and what they're expected to do when  
15 they get there.

16 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you very much for  
17 your testimony.

18 MR. COLLINS: I just have one more question.

19 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Go ahead.

20 MR. COLLINS: So, as an engineer, I kind of help solve  
21 problems. I think what happens in an extreme, it seems that we  
22 have a case here we study it on the precipice of something  
23 disorganized and somewhat chaotic.

24 Let's take it to a slightly larger storm where we need more  
25 people and, yet, it seems like we can't organize them or house

1       them or feed them adequately. So the worse the storm is, if it  
2       was worse than Sandy, then we would have an even bigger problem.

3               So, in your mind, is the emergency plan that's going on  
4       taking or thinking about that circumstance, that the worse the  
5       storm, the bigger the -- the more challenging the supply chain  
6       elements are to be solved?

7               MR. QUINIONES: I think so, although technology should be  
8       helpful. I don't think it's a one-to-one linear correspondence.  
9       So technology and better ways of organizing and optimizing the  
10       workforce to do the restoration work could be designed with  
11       different size of storms going forward.

12               EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you for your  
13       testimony this evening, Mr. Quiniones.

14               MR. QUINIONES: Thank you.

15               EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Our next speaker will be  
16       Nassau County Executive Ed Mangano.

17               NASSAU COUNTY EXECUTIVE MANGANO: Thank you. Members of  
18       the Moreland Commission, thank you for the opportunity to  
19       address you this evening on behalf of Nassau County's 1.3  
20       million residents.

21               Over the past few years, our residents have been subjected  
22       to a drastic change in Long Island's weather patterns. In fact,  
23       in just the past two years, we've endured stronger storms such  
24       as Hurricanes Irene and Sandy.

25               Hurricane Sandy tested our infrastructure and our emergency

1 response plans. Clearly, Hurricane Sandy highlighted our  
2 strengths and exposed our weaknesses. The most prominent  
3 weakness was with electric restoration.

4 The Long Island Power Authority's response to the  
5 widespread power outages was inadequate. Improvements are  
6 clearly required in logistics, emergency preparedness,  
7 operations, maintenance, and communication between LIPA and its  
8 customers.

9 LIPA remained vague at best with respect to when the  
10 residents could expect their power to be restored, and many  
11 times estimates were lengthened after reported. In fact, it  
12 took eight full days before LIPA announced that as many as  
13 100,000 south shore homes would require electrical inspections  
14 for water damage before their power could be restored.

15 Nassau County relies on electric power to run our  
16 hospitals, power communication networks, provide public safety  
17 from traffic lights to street lights. So loss of power is a  
18 serious threat to the safety of our residents.

19 This storm also demonstrated that the typical generator  
20 backup is no match for salt water infiltration. Therefore, it's  
21 in everyone's best interest to learn from Hurricane Sandy and  
22 move forward with implementing a system that is better  
23 positioned to avoid salt water intrusion and respond to downed  
24 tree outages. Improvements in communication, logistics,  
25 emergency preparedness, operations, maintenance, and critical

1 infrastructure are the path to a reliable power system.

2 The Long Island Power Authority had appeared to lack a  
3 comprehensive plan for restoring power to homes severely damaged  
4 by flooding. For example, although LIPA called in thousands of  
5 out of town workers, it appeared a dispatch work order plan was  
6 not in place to efficiently direct the numerous responding  
7 crews. In fact, a common reported complaint was communications  
8 between LIPA and the out-of-town workers. Often crews  
9 complained about waiting for work orders from LIPA.

10 During the clean-up process, communication between LIPA and  
11 local municipalities, and between LIPA and its customers  
12 continued to lack accurate or definitive information. In fact,  
13 my office was inundated with thousands of LIPA customer phone  
14 calls because residents were simply unable to reach a LIPA  
15 customer service representative. Accordingly, my office and our  
16 office of emergency management recorded names, phone numbers,  
17 and addresses of residents and emailed them nightly to the  
18 utility in an effort to assist our residents.

19 Throughout the end of October and all of November I  
20 repeatedly made a simple request, for LIPA to adequately relay  
21 pertinent information to Nassau's residents and urged LIPA to  
22 establish information sites in the affected areas.

23 Due to LIPA's failure to communicate as to when power and  
24 heat might be turned on, the residents and municipalities were  
25 in the dark when it came for planning for the length of

1 alternative housing and housing needs. Accordingly, LIPA must  
2 implement an effective plan for restoring power to Long Island  
3 residents, and they must communicate with localities in a more  
4 efficient manner so we're able to partner with the utility to  
5 better serve our residents.

6 My suggestion to avoid communication failures can be  
7 addressed by implementing the following recommendations:

8 Contract with a stand-by call center for emergencies,  
9 develop bullet point instructions for the LIPA representative  
10 who's stationed at the Office of Emergency Management for  
11 dissemination through the OEM command structure, establish a  
12 mobile outreach plan similar to the Nassau County Police and our  
13 Office of Emergency Management where we have mobile command  
14 centers that go out and reach out to the public to inform them,  
15 communicate LIPA's restoration plan via the internet and mobile  
16 command centers, and obviously improve LIPA's website with more  
17 geographic specific data.

18 With respect to logistics, I have the following  
19 suggestions:

20 Develop a clear restoration plan, establish the stand-by  
21 contract with electrical inspectors and volunteer firefighters,  
22 educate the public and local government officials as to how each  
23 substation services their area.

24 With respect to mitigating the damage for future storms, I  
25 suggest the following:

1           Develop emergency response teams that include damage  
2 assessors to work with OEM, first responders and local  
3 municipalities in coordinating power restoration, develop a  
4 state of the art outage management plan which utilizes available  
5 software to speed communication and logistics and public  
6 outreach, downed trees require a better vegetation management  
7 program, underground line distribution must be studied and  
8 implemented where practical, and develop and implement an  
9 emergency management preparedness plan that considers now  
10 Hurricane Sandy salt water infiltration and power outages grid,  
11 and develop disaster mitigation policies for residents and  
12 business owners who have unique demands and needs and often  
13 found themselves without answers.

14           Clearly the time for action is now. History has provided  
15 an important lesson. Let us learn from it or we'll be destined  
16 to repeat it. I wish to thank the members of the Moreland  
17 Commission and Governor Cuomo for providing this forum. The  
18 testimony you receive and the amendments you proffer will have  
19 the import of better protecting every resident in our region.  
20 Working together we can and will rebuild better, stronger, and  
21 safer. Thank you.

22           EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you. DA Rice.

23           MS. RICE: Good evening, County Executive Mangano.

24           NASSAU COUNTY EXECUTIVE MANGANO: Good evening.

25           MS. RICE: If you could just -- I'm sure I know this for a

1 fact that the county had its own emergency preparedness plan in  
2 place that I know was planned days in advance and you know what  
3 you could do as a county.

4 To what extent did LIPA reach out to you as the county  
5 executive to someone in your administration to tell you what  
6 their plan was going to be right after the storm, in terms of  
7 their ability to communicate, and did you find the daily phone  
8 calls with LIPA that they had with the municipalities across  
9 Long Island, helpful at all in giving you relevant information?

10 NASSAU COUNTY EXECUTIVE MANGANO: Clearly the phone calls  
11 and the communication was a benefit. That system was in place.  
12 However, the information in those calls did not address our  
13 questions and the needs. So you really need a better  
14 communication system, not only for government, with respect to  
15 what their plan is, how they're going to approach it, and where  
16 they're going to begin.

17 We often found that the information changed after being  
18 reported and that was troubling. With respect to communicating  
19 with the residents the plan, we were unable to do that because  
20 we were not receiving enough information in the call to pass on  
21 to our residents that was reliable. So it's a continuing issue  
22 with respect to communication.

23 I do, you know -- there was a system in place where I was  
24 able to reach Mike Hervey. He answered my calls. For instance,  
25 I requested that they go out with mobile information centers and

1 participate in the information centers that we are setting up,  
2 even though the public is angry, and they were angry at the  
3 power issue, I believe it would have been a much better path to  
4 confront the issue, and provide information right in the  
5 neighborhood. We found that very effective for all the other  
6 areas of response from FEMA, from the state, from the county,  
7 and we believe that LIPA really should have followed that path.

8 MS. RICE: Well, do you have any insight as to why it was  
9 that their information was not relevant or timely or informative  
10 at all?

11 NASSAU COUNTY EXECUTIVE MANGANO: I think part of it is the  
12 present infrastructure that they have. They did not have the  
13 software in place that, at least my understanding, that would  
14 allow them to input the data from the work crews and then  
15 disseminate that in an organized fashion to the residents. I'm  
16 not clear on why they could not do that orally and get out and  
17 meet the -- or address the questions that the residents were  
18 having. I don't have an answer for that other than clearly a  
19 better communication plan needs to be thought of prior to  
20 responding to storms.

21 As you mentioned before, we work on our emergency plan  
22 throughout the year. We look at each storm that's past and we  
23 update our plan. It's very very detailed. It's set to the  
24 weather pattern and guided by the hours away from the actual  
25 weather event. We enact our plan as we go along.

1 MS. RICE: Just one final question. Did you see any or  
2 notice any difference between their ability to communicate with  
3 you between Irene and Sandy; better, worse, the same?

4 NASSAU COUNTY EXECUTIVE MANGANO: We experienced some  
5 issues in Irene, but it just did not have the demand and the  
6 residential demand that this storm had. So, again, I did not  
7 see that they utilized Irene as a learning lesson as we did and  
8 went back and looked at Irene and made changes.

9 For instance, we cross trained all of our ordinance  
10 employees to serve as shelter managers and shelter staff because  
11 we saw in Irene there was a shortage of trained personnel to  
12 handle sheltering. I don't know if those best practices in that  
13 type of study was completed after Irene for utility, it's  
14 certainly a great question for them. But, clearly, if it was,  
15 it didn't result in the action plan that ensued post Sandy.

16 CO-CHAIR ABRAMS: How do you shelter 10,000 newcomers into  
17 a community?

18 NASSAU COUNTY EXECUTIVE MANGANO: It is quite a challenge,  
19 but first you start with a plan, which we had in place and  
20 improved, as I said. You make sure you have your assets in  
21 place way before the storm hits, you make sure you have the  
22 ability to open up 20 or 30 shelters.

23 To give you an example, in our first nor'easter when I took  
24 office, we only had the ability, believe it or not, to  
25 effectively staff, and the Red Cross at the time, effectively

1 staff one shelter. In Irene, we were able to move up to a dozen  
2 shelters, and here in Sandy quite more than that. There's a lot  
3 to shelter not just having the assets, but you obviously you  
4 need to have in place trained personnel that understands how to  
5 set up the shelters for safety reasons, for other -- for many  
6 reasons, and it's important to plan.

7 There are, really, I have to say, post 9/11, there are many  
8 training courses available out there that you can avail yourself  
9 as a municipality and certainly as a utility that allows you to  
10 cross train your employees to handle these type of situations so  
11 you're prepared to respond with qualified personnel which is,  
12 you know, which is always a concern when you have an emergency  
13 on the way. So you really need to prepare way in advance;  
14 training, studying, placing assets, updating those assets,  
15 working closely with our police department, our emergency  
16 responders, certainly our volunteer firefighters, probation  
17 officers, fire marshal.

18 You need to really coordinate with all the tools that are  
19 available to you that -- in which you operate your  
20 municipalities so can you organize them to staff up quickly.

21 CO-CHAIR ABRAMS: Where do you house them? Were the  
22 public facility, schools, religious institutions unavailable  
23 because they lacked power, or was there emergency and auxiliary  
24 power where perhaps those assets could be utilized?

25 NASSAU COUNTY EXECUTIVE MANGANO: Exactly that. First you

1 try to pick schools that have generators, in the optimum world  
2 those are the ones that we utilize first for our residents. We  
3 set up a residential shelter, a special needs shelter, pet  
4 shelter, orthodox shelter so they all have different needs and  
5 different training requirements. We make sure we are able to do  
6 that in an efficient manner.

7 In addition, we housed our emergency responders at our  
8 Office of Emergency Management which we relocated from the  
9 basement of the jail to, actually, the Morelli Center, which was  
10 actually supported by federal and state dollars, it was a  
11 wonderful resource, and I know we shared, County Executive Steve  
12 Bellone and I, were both able to interact in that building and  
13 coordinate with state and federal officials, and it also has  
14 enough space where we can put cots and house our responders.

15 We also utilized the police academy where we were able to  
16 house responders, and you have to just be prepared for that type  
17 of influx. Housing is a challenge here in Nassau County. Hotel  
18 rooms were short. Available space is short, and it was  
19 definitely a challenge that needs to be considered as part of  
20 the best practices moving forward.

21 MR. COLLINS: Just to push on that just a little more, same  
22 kind of question, supposing it had been twice as bad, the storm,  
23 and we're talking about the physical assets that are there for  
24 you to utilize, to house the emergency responders, if it's twice  
25 as bad, the physical assets -- are you prepared to bring FEMA

1 trailers in to bring other resources, mobile resources that  
2 bring them in, is that part of the plan?

3 NASSAU COUNTY EXECUTIVE MANGANO: Well, during the storm,  
4 in response to storm, those type of assets follow way after the  
5 storm settles, to be honest with you. There aren't trailers  
6 being delivered beforehand. There's not housing being delivered  
7 beforehand.

8 Basically you need to be prepared prior to the storm and in  
9 a sheltering plan to get through the event. So those are the  
10 cot-type setups and those type of assets to have in place so you  
11 can rapidly house and find a place for emergency responders to  
12 rest. They really don't rest a lot, by the way, they just need  
13 a place to crash for, you know, several hours and they're up and  
14 helping the public again.

15 So, again, we have a shortage in housing supply here and  
16 something that needs to be studied and thoughtfully looked at.  
17 Even to this day, we're asking FEMA to assist us with allowing  
18 mobile homes to qualify and be reimbursable for an alternate  
19 housing option which is a resistance. The actual mobile homes  
20 they used in Katrina, there is a resistance to reuse them  
21 because of the problems they had with them.

22 Another issue here in the northeast is that many of the  
23 trailer homes and those RVs are not insulated. They're vacation  
24 homes. They're typically used in the summer and they are not  
25 prepared to withstand the winter, the cold that we have here in

1 the winter weather which shrinks that option a bit.

2 MR. GREEN: You said in your testimony thoughtfully that  
3 perhaps the Moreland Commission, among others, could look at  
4 laying wires underground to the extent practical. I've said to  
5 myself, and I've been an elected official and I understand the  
6 responsibility in needs, and I thought, that's careful and  
7 thoughtful. So Manhattan, New York City, has it underground so  
8 it's less vulnerable to weather, trees falling and failure. And  
9 public officials don't like spending money now to benefit  
10 someone in 10 years when they're out of office.

11 So, if someone said to you, and this has not been  
12 discussed, there's a proposal to have a surtax of \$100 a person  
13 in Nassau because that's what it would cost to lay the wires  
14 underground, so we're better prepared for the next storm. You  
15 should never ask for hypotheticals, but I'm seeing if you would  
16 make an exception.

17 What do you, as an elected official, say to that?

18 NASSAU COUNTY EXECUTIVE MANGANO: This is an opportunity to  
19 not only rebuild but, most importantly, we must use this time to  
20 mitigate for what we have now, are known salt-water infiltration  
21 and new flood maps and new challenges here in the county. At  
22 this point everything is on the table as we thoughtfully  
23 consider how to move our county forward to make the county a  
24 safer county.

25 So, you know, with that, I would expect that our federal

1 partners hopefully will come through with the dollars that we  
2 requested for not only rebuilding but for mitigation, and part  
3 of those mitigation dollars should go to protect our critical  
4 infrastructure, our hospitals, our sewage system as we saw, we  
5 should be able to keep our police departments functioning, our  
6 public safety facilities functioning, our water districts  
7 functioning. So we need to look at these, especially these --  
8 this critical infrastructure that is now in an area that is  
9 subject to salt-water infiltration and come up with a plan that  
10 works and be honest with our residents as to the costs  
11 associated with moving our county forward.

12 So, absolutely. Everything is on the table. The only  
13 thing I insist on is that we look at a plan that is thoughtful,  
14 that you can implement and that is ex -- that can be done  
15 expeditiously because, just a year from now we'll be back in  
16 hurricane season, and, currently now, as we go into the winter  
17 we see snow, ice and high winds could present similar problems  
18 that we experienced here in Hurricane Sandy in smaller  
19 geographic areas and we need to be positioned to protect the  
20 public.

21 MR. GREEN: Thank you.

22 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you very much County  
23 Executive Mangano for your testimony and also for your specific  
24 recommendations that you provided the Moreland Commission.

25 The next speaker is Suffolk County Executive Steve Bellone.

1           SUFFOLK COUNTY EXECUTIVE BELLONE: Good evening. First let  
2 me thank you, the members of the Moreland Commission on utility  
3 storm preparation and response for coming today to Long Island.  
4 Thank for your hard work to learn the truth about what went  
5 wrong during Super Storm Sandy so that we can make sound public  
6 policy judgments to correct these errors.

7           I want to thank Governor Cuomo for putting together the  
8 Moreland Commission given that some of the greatest utility  
9 failures impacted Long Island residents. In particular, I want  
10 to thank my Chief Deputy County Executive Regina Calcaterra for  
11 serving as executive director. Regina served alongside me in  
12 the Suffolk County Emergency Operation Center during the storm  
13 and in its aftermath, and I know that her firsthand knowledge of  
14 the storm and how it impacted Suffolk County residents has  
15 proven invaluable to this commission. Though she's sorely  
16 missed in the county right now, governor Cuomo could not have  
17 made a better selection for this commission.

18           I've decided to focus my testimony on my experience with  
19 LIPA during the storm hoping that it provide some helpful  
20 insight to the commission and its work.

21           We all know that LIPA failed. We know that failure was not  
22 the result of the men and women on the front lines who were  
23 working as hard as they could to restore power as quickly as  
24 possible. We know that that failure occurred at the highest  
25 levels of the organization.

1           As Regina and anyone who has worked with me knows, I'm not  
2           somebody who is interested in blame or grandstanding. My  
3           preference is always to work cooperatively alongside fellow  
4           elected officials and other public servants to serve the public  
5           interest.

6           That is why I was surprised as anyone on November 9th of  
7           this year when I found myself dispatching Suffolk County  
8           employees including Suffolk County Police Officers to LIPA  
9           substations in order to get real-time information about what was  
10          happening on the ground.

11          The impetus for my actions began during the so-called  
12          electrical inspection process. Days after Super Storm Sandy,  
13          officials throughout Long Island, including myself, were  
14          notified by LIPA for the first time that, in order for power to  
15          be restored to tens of thousands of homes in flooded  
16          neighborhoods, homeowners would need to have an electrical  
17          inspection, conducted by and receive -- excuse me, and receive  
18          an electrical inspection certificate.

19          It was immediately apparent that there had been no advanced  
20          planning on how to conduct electrical inspections on a massive  
21          scale, despite the fact that the consequences of the interaction  
22          between water and electricity are well known, as is the fact  
23          that many of these neighborhoods are in flood zones. In fact,  
24          there had never been any such evaluations in any prior event.

25          However, like many of my fellow officials, my focus was not

1 on castigating LIPA for its lack on foresight and planning, it  
2 was to quickly establish a process to help homeowners get this  
3 work done. If this was to be a requirement for homeowners to  
4 get their power back on, I felt that we had an obligation to do  
5 everything we could to help them.

6 Understand that, as we are now, at this point improvising  
7 an electrical inspection process, homeowners have been without  
8 power for nearly a week. I brought in my commissioner of labor,  
9 Sam Chu, who also happens to be a master electrician, to  
10 work with our emergency management team to quickly develop this  
11 program. The events that followed completely eroded my belief  
12 that LIPA was capable of serving Long Island residents  
13 effectively.

14 In my conversations with LIPA executives, I heard plans and  
15 rationales that were constantly shifting. In Suffolk County, we  
16 had whole neighborhoods where power was restored while we were  
17 still scrambling to develop an electrical inspection process.

18 In at least one case in Mastic Beach, where power had been  
19 restored prior to inspections, power was then subsequently cut  
20 to those homes in order for inspections to occur only to have  
21 that position changed by LIPA after a public outcry.

22 One member of my staff who resides in Babylon Village had  
23 his power restored as did his neighbors, despite the fact that  
24 he had three feet of flooding in his home and no electrical  
25 inspection. When I questioned LIPA management, I was told that

1 these must be isolated incidents.

2 As we developed the inspection process, it quickly became  
3 clear that the infrastructure did not exist to inspect thousands  
4 of homes in a timeframe that would be acceptable. We discovered  
5 that we actually had a very limited number of electrical  
6 inspectors in our region.

7 So, over the span of just a few days, LIPA's policy evolved  
8 from requiring homeowners to secure an electrical inspection  
9 certificate, by electrical inspectors, to "assessments" by local  
10 volunteers with no specific training.

11 After just a couple of days, it was clear that this process  
12 was not working and we were not serving the public interest.  
13 Homeowners were becoming increasingly cold and desperate. We  
14 had numerous reports of unsafe actions as residents were trying  
15 to protect themselves and their families; generators being  
16 placed inside homes, kerosene heaters being used, seniors living  
17 in homes with no heat. One man was stopped, poking a stick at a  
18 transformer, trying to restore power to his block.

19 Working with Babylon Town Supervisor Rich Schaefer and with  
20 the assistance of the governor's office, we were able to  
21 convince LIPA that we had to change course. However, LIPA  
22 altered course once again, saying they could not turn the power  
23 back on because their attorneys still had concerns about  
24 liability. In that one conversation it became clear to me that  
25 this whole process was never truly about public safety, it was

1 about lawyers and liability.

2 We ended the inspection process. Later that day on a  
3 conference call with municipal officials, from both counties,  
4 the discussion revolved around whether we should just allow  
5 homeowners to submit written affidavits that their homes had  
6 been inspected. That was my last municipal call. This was day  
7 11 without power.

8 At that point, I effectively ceased communication with LIPA  
9 headquarters and made the decision to communicate directly with  
10 the men and women at the substations, the people on the front  
11 lines, the people who had the actual information.

12 So on November 9th, I sent 30 Suffolk County employees to  
13 get the facts to that I could assess what resources were on the  
14 ground and make sure we were doing everything we could to  
15 restore the power. And, yes, when some of those employees were  
16 turned away, at the direction of those at LIPA headquarters, I  
17 sent Suffolk County Police to get the facts.

18 For the next three days I worked directly with the  
19 employees of the control centers and the substations to get the  
20 power back on. When you know the facts, when you know what the  
21 resources are on the ground, where they are, and where the  
22 outages are, you can get the job done. It is clear that LIPA  
23 headquarters did not have that ability.

24 My experience during this storm event demonstrated several  
25 things to me. LIPA had no plan to handle massive flooding, an

1       eventuality that was entirely predictable. My experience at the  
2       control centers and substations showed me that there is a  
3       disconnect between LIPA management, and the people on the ground  
4       and on the front lines.

5               Finally, this storm exposed clearly LIPA management's  
6       complete inability to effectively communicate relevant  
7       information to municipal officials and the public. The efforts  
8       of Governor Cuomo and this Moreland Commission are critical to  
9       our communities because they deserve to hear the whole  
10      unvarnished truth. That truth is critical to restoring the  
11      public trust.

12             I look forward to working alongside you to ensure that we  
13      give Suffolk County residents and all New York residents  
14      reliable, affordable utilities we can be proud of. Thank you.

15             EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you for your  
16      testimony.

17             REVEREND FLAKE: Thank you for the honesty of your report.

18             My question is, now that you have revealed what the  
19      conditions were and how the responses were not appropriate for  
20      that time, can you give us some solutions you've come up with  
21      since you've had an opportunity now to look back on this  
22      problem?

23             SUFFOLK COUNTY EXECUTIVE BELLONE: Well, I'm counting on  
24      you to solve this. I have to say that all of this I think  
25      clearly demonstrates a massive barrier of leadership. Now, the

1 question for me that I have struggled with and thought about is,  
2 is that leadership gap the result of the structural nature of  
3 LIPA, or is it simply a failure of the leadership team that was  
4 in place at LIPA? I'm not sure of the answer to that question.  
5 But I think that needs to be examined very carefully because  
6 there is an interesting management structure here at LIPA.

7 For me, as I observe this, and saw that at LIPA  
8 headquarters, that they lacked -- as I worked directly with  
9 control centers and the substations, and we're speaking directly  
10 to the people deploying the resources, that I had the  
11 information, at least 24 hours in advance of what LIPA  
12 headquarters had, which is why at end of the day, I ended  
13 communications with LIPA headquarters because, at that point, it  
14 was evident that they didn't have the real relevant timely  
15 information that would be helpful to me in the exercise of my  
16 duties.

17 So when you have this sort of structural arrangement where  
18 you have this management structure, but a contract agency,  
19 essentially, that is running the utilities, the question becomes  
20 whether there's a gap between what one is doing and thinks they  
21 need to be doing, or do they think that the management team is  
22 not interested in that and, therefore, they're not going to  
23 pursue those things.

24 So there are I think important questions that need to be  
25 examined about the structure and its impact on this clear

1 leadership vacuum.

2 CO-CHAIR LAWSKY: When you speak about -- I hear you tell  
3 the story of trying to get the power on for the substations and  
4 what seemed to, I have to say, sounds like heroic efforts to try  
5 and get your community's power back on, I wonder how much of  
6 that failure at the utility do you think was technological?

7 In other words, when my cable goes out and I call  
8 Cablevision, I can tell the guy on the other end of the line,  
9 can you see what channel I was watching? He's got the  
10 technology to know in my individual house, he can actually flip  
11 my channel from some computer he's sitting at far away. To  
12 think that the utility can't even figure out what substations  
13 are up, let alone whose house is on, seems like a real  
14 technological failure versus how much of that failure do you  
15 think was more management failure, these failures with knowing  
16 what was on, what wasn't on, and how to flip the switch and  
17 where to flip the switch?

18 SUFFOLK COUNTY EXECUTIVE BELLONE: I think there was major  
19 technological failure brought on by a major management failure,  
20 if I can say it like that. I think it is absolutely  
21 extraordinary that LIPA headquarters -- and this is what I came  
22 to understand through this two-week process that, in many ways,  
23 what's happening at headquarters, there's a complete disconnect.  
24 They are not aware even remotely, in my view, to the extent they  
25 should be, about where their resources are and how they're being

1 deployed. That that is happening on an extremely localized  
2 level.

3 And while the people on the front lines I think were  
4 working incredibly hard and were incredibly dedicated people,  
5 the fact that the command center doesn't seem to have that  
6 understanding where those resources are is a technological  
7 failure without question, and a management failure.

8 I think an excellent example of where technology would make  
9 sense is in the ability to communicate. You know, this system  
10 is -- the system has a spine and then it has sort of the  
11 branches off of it, and there's a methodology for how the power  
12 gets restored, if you're near a hospital, if you're near a  
13 nursing home, even if you're off the branch, you're going to get  
14 restored beforehand.

15 If you're off the branch lines, you're going to get  
16 restored first. The further away you get from those major  
17 branches, the more towards the end of the storm you would be.

18 So it seems to me that with the technology that we have  
19 today, or even the technology that we had in the '90s, that it  
20 would be fairly simple to be able to tell residents within a 24  
21 to 48-hour period after a storm about when they are likely to be  
22 restored, and what is their window. You can make that a  
23 conservative number, but you can I think without doubt, if you  
24 implement the right technology, give people that information. I  
25 think that is absolutely critical.

1           That's why I stopped the municipal calls. We weren't  
2 getting any information that was relevant or that was useful for  
3 us in the exercise of our duties or to communicate to the  
4 public. What the public wants to know is, when are my lights  
5 going to come back on? And that's not just, you know, a sort of  
6 side question or philosophical question, it's for people -- you  
7 know, you can withstand it's human nature, you can withstand  
8 being tortured if you know when it's going to end. It's the not  
9 knowing, you know, every day coming home to a house that's cold  
10 and dark and having no idea when that's going to change, that's  
11 torturous to people. It seems to me that this is something that  
12 should be able to in 2012 not be the case.

13           MR. COLLINS:     Just a quick point of clarification.  
14 Earlier you kept referring to LIPA management as the issue.  
15 Does your definition of LIPA management include National Grid  
16 management?

17           SUFFOLK COUNTY EXECUTIVE BELLONE: Well, obviously they  
18 were coordinating together during the storm, but I'm referring  
19 to the LIPA management team, the executive management and the  
20 200 --

21           MR. COLLINS:     Thank you.

22           SUFFOLK COUNTY EXECUTIVE BELLONE:     -- that core group,  
23 yes.

24           EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA:     County Executive Bellone,  
25 thank you very much for your testimony, your insight, and as a

1 Suffolk resident for your leadership during the storm.

2 SUFFOLK COUNTY EXECUTIVE BELLONE: Looking forward to  
3 seeing you soon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, members of  
4 the commission.

5 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Next up will be Marissa  
6 Shorenstein the New York President of AT&T.

7 What was important for the Moreland Commission is not just  
8 to speak to emergency managers and executive and municipal  
9 leaders, but also to reach out to those who managed critical  
10 infrastructure as our fuel terminals, our airports, our mass  
11 transportation and, of course, our communication, which is  
12 Telecom. So that's why it was important for us to have a  
13 representative from AT&T today, and we are so pleased that we  
14 have Marissa Shorenstein. Thank you.

15 MS. SHORENSTEIN: Good evening and thank you so much for  
16 providing AT&T with the opportunity to assist the Moreland  
17 Commission in gathering information about customer experiences  
18 with New York electric utility companies during Super Storm  
19 Sandy, Hurricane Irene, and the tropical storm.

20 AT&T shares the Moreland Commission's commitment to  
21 improving the sustainability of vital infrastructure and  
22 communication systems during natural disasters and emergencies,  
23 and the efficient restoration of critical services after such  
24 events.

25 Telecommunications companies and electric utilities share

1 many interdependencies and the commission's investigation will  
2 help identify the opportunities for improvement that are  
3 reasonably available and provide the most benefit relative to  
4 the costs they place on New Yorkers.

5 As the storm approached, AT&T pre-positioned and prepared  
6 personnel and assets from within and outside the impacted areas  
7 to be ready to spring into action as soon as the storm passed.  
8 Specifically, AT&T prepared, pre-staged and deployed literally  
9 thousands of generators across several states. AT&T drew on  
10 numerous resources to stock pile generators for Sandy, including  
11 from neighboring markets outside of the storm area, from central  
12 warehouse locations, from our affiliates and supply partners  
13 until we were comfortable that we could have an adequate supply  
14 of mobile generators. Ultimately, AT&T operated over 3,000  
15 generators over the storm impact area.

16 As you know, generators require periodic refueling and, in  
17 response, we engaged a fleet of over 50 tankers to import fuel  
18 to our staging areas coming from locations as far as Texas.

19 AT&T deployed an army of employees and contractors from  
20 more than a dozen states all working around the clock, utilizing  
21 AT&T's vast network discovery recovery assets to restore  
22 services as quickly as possible and in New York and the other  
23 states hardest hit by the storm.

24 AT&T worked closely with government agencies to keep them  
25 informed of our service restoration program and to place

1 portable wireless facilities, cells on wheels, known as COWS,  
2 satellite cells on light trucks known as COLTS, and other  
3 emergency communications vehicles known as ECVs where they were  
4 most needed. We provided free wireless phones to first  
5 responders. We set up free charging and wi-fi stations so that  
6 people without power, whether AT&T customers or not, could  
7 charge their phones, make calls, and connect to the internet.

8 Because AT&T and T-Mobile use comparable GSM network  
9 technologies, we entered into roaming agreement with T-Mobile  
10 allowing customers to use whichever network was most functional  
11 with no roaming charges.

12 Because we faced some of the same service restoration  
13 challenges as the electric utilities, AT&T can offer some  
14 constructive suggestions on improvements that will better  
15 prepare electric companies and landline carriers for future  
16 disasters.

17 As the commission is aware, the wireless network requires  
18 electric power to operate both at cell sites and at facilities  
19 houses network electronics. AT&T anticipates disruption in  
20 commercial power in events such as Sandy, and has an expansive  
21 program in place to ensure backup power is readily available.  
22 That said, the reliability and availability of commercial power  
23 following natural disasters can be improved.

24 It's important to note that commercial power outages  
25 adversely effect AT&T telecommunications facilities in two ways.

1 First, when power is lost to AT&T facilities and equipment, such  
2 as at cell sites or cell towers with AT&T wireless equipment,  
3 AT&T must use alternative backup power to support its facilities  
4 and equipment. As previously noted, AT&T did so utilizing a  
5 combination of battery backup, fixed generators, and mobile  
6 generators.

7 Second, power outages also impact facilities AT&T purchases  
8 from third parties. AT&T purchases substantial quantities of  
9 back hall and transport facilities that connect AT&T cell sites  
10 to our mobile switching infrastructure from other  
11 telecommunications service providers. Sub-services are  
12 generally provided by landline facilities.

13 The providers of back hall and transport circuits also rely  
14 on commercial power at their locations for the circuits to work.  
15 Thus, even if AT&T has power at its own cell sites, if our  
16 transport and back hall circuit providers cannot provide service  
17 because of a power outage, AT&T's wireless systems connected to  
18 those circuits are effectively out of service.

19 Transport and back hall outages were a substantial problem  
20 for AT&T in the wake of Sandy. In most instances, where AT&T  
21 cell systems were not functioning, the problem was the absence  
22 of working back hall transport circuits, not any failures of  
23 AT&T's backup power program.

24 Some improvements are relatively easy and inexpensive. For  
25 example, going forward, AT&T recommends that cell sites and

1 other locations housing telecommunications electronics be  
2 designated for high priority service restoration.

3 Consumers being are becoming increasingly reliant on  
4 wireless services for voice data and video needs and prompt  
5 restoration of wireless services will keep them connected to  
6 their world.

7 More importantly, first responders including power company  
8 field personnel have also become more dependent on wireless  
9 communications. To further aid and prompt service restoration,  
10 AT&T recommends that electric utilities accelerate the placement  
11 of smart meters at telecommunications facilities. Smart meters  
12 can provide the electric companies with real-time information on  
13 specific locations where power has been disrupted. Once  
14 telecommunications facilities are equipped with smart meters and  
15 have been designated for high priority service restoration,  
16 power disruptions at telecommunications facilities can be kept  
17 to a minimum. Other changes will require more investment.

18 One lesson from Sandy is the importance of preventing salt  
19 water from penetrating power and landline telecommunication  
20 systems in central business districts such as Manhattan, where  
21 wireless carriers may not be able to physically or safely place  
22 stationary generators or deploy portable generators because of  
23 the height and density of buildings.

24 Thank you for the opportunity to testify.

25 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you. Tony Collins.

1 MR. COLLINS: You just mentioned that smart meters would  
2 give you the capacity to be a priority for restoration of power.

3 MS. SHORENSTEIN: No. I had two recommendations. One  
4 would be that we would be -- telecommunications providers would  
5 be a priority, and the other was the placement of smart meters.

6 MR. COLLINS: Well, given we've heard that there's so much  
7 that communication is an issue, right now is AT&T as a priority  
8 for power to be restored so that you can use your wireless  
9 devices? A priority with the utilities so they will re-power  
10 you?

11 MS. SHORENSTEIN: Currently that's the recommendation we're  
12 making, that we become --

13 MR. COLLINS: Right. But right now there is no priority.  
14 Thank you.

15 MS. SHORENSTEIN: Sure.

16 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Any other questions?

17 (No verbal response.)

18 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you very much,  
19 Ms. Shorenstein. It was greatly appreciated and very very  
20 helpful.

21 MS. SHORENSTEIN: Thank you.

22 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Our next speaker -- what I  
23 want to do because our next speaker is Helena Williams, the  
24 president of Long Island Rail Road, I also want to start telling  
25 folks who is on deck so they can be prepared to come on up here

1 right afterwards. I will let you know that Matt Cordaro from  
2 the LIPA Oversight Committee will be next. Thank you.

3 Thank you so much for joining us this evening.

4 MS. WILLIAMS: Good evening, Chairman Abrams and Lawsky,  
5 and members of the distinguished commission. My name is Helena  
6 Williams and I'm the president of Long Island Rail Road. I have  
7 held this position since June 2007.

8 Thank you for the opportunity to talk with you about the  
9 railroad's interactions with the two electrical power utilities  
10 that provide us with service, that is LIPA and Con Edison, in  
11 the period before, during and after Super Storm Sandy.

12 I'd like to just briefly note that as of Monday, the Long  
13 Island Rail Road has been operating all of our scheduled peak  
14 a.m. and p.m. trains, and is providing our extra holiday service  
15 in the off peak as well. Our employees have worked tirelessly  
16 to restore as much service to Long Island as soon as possible.

17 Throughout the last six weeks, we have placed a premium on  
18 keeping our customers informed by continuously updating them on  
19 our progress, issuing hundreds of email alerts, as well as  
20 producing temporary printed timetables using Facebook, Twitter  
21 and MTA.info and briefing the media regularly. We even had the  
22 opportunity to print our temporary schedules Newsday, did that  
23 as a public service as we continued to update the service that  
24 we were providing throughout the storm aftermath.

25 As background, the Long Island Rail Road is part of the

1 MTA. The railroad is one of the largest and oldest commuter  
2 railroads in the country, serving three major New York City  
3 terminals including Penn Station, the busiest train station in  
4 North America. We have over 700 miles of track and carry an  
5 average of 300,000 customers each day to and from jobs in New  
6 York City. We are a critical part of the region's  
7 transportation network and a vital component of the local  
8 economy, providing a link between employers in Manhattan and  
9 their employees living in the boroughs and outlying communities  
10 as well as providing freight service to Long Island. We carry  
11 highly skilled employees to high paying job who bring their  
12 paychecks back to Long Island supporting local businesses, local  
13 jobs, and local government. Many Long Island communities grew  
14 up around one of our 124 stations which are often located in the  
15 heart of local villages and towns across Long Island.

16 Power to our extensive system is supplied by LIPA in  
17 Nassau, Suffolk and limited portions of Queens. In the balance  
18 of Queens, Brooklyn and Manhattan, we purchase electricity from  
19 NYPA, and this power is distributed to us by Con Edison. We are  
20 dependent on the power they supply for third-rail power and for  
21 power to signal grade crossings and other critical operational  
22 systems. They also power stations and terminals and employee  
23 and business facilities of the railroad.

24 On an average yearly basis, the Long Island Rail Road pays  
25 LIPA over \$44 million per year and we pay NYPA over \$41 million

1 annually. Electricity is the life blood of our operation.  
2 Without the continual and reliable supply of power, our system  
3 is brought to a standstill. Although the Long Island Rail Road  
4 operates a fleet of diesel powered equipment in addition to our  
5 fleet of electric train equipment, in the event of a loss of  
6 power to the signal system and the grade crossing equipment, we  
7 are severely limited in our ability to provide diesel only  
8 service.

9 Knowing the criticality of power supply, our management  
10 team has been proactive in working with utilities establishing  
11 points of contact and protocols to cover emergency situations.  
12 The utilities and the Long Island Rail Road regularly  
13 participate in each other's training and emergency preparedness  
14 drills. In many of our infrastructure projects, are, by  
15 necessity, planned in cooperation with the power utilities.

16 LIPA has been a particular focus for us as they serve the  
17 larger geographic portion of the railroad and they have a  
18 greater preponderance of above ground power lines, as opposed to  
19 Con Edison, which largely provides power to the railroad via  
20 underground lines.

21 Accordingly, in January 2010, LIPA and the Long Island Rail  
22 Road implemented a revised and updated memorandum of  
23 understanding setting forth an emergency action plan to be  
24 followed by the parties. This emergency action plan creates a  
25 unified command structure, establishes incident levels and

1 required responses based upon the operational effect of an  
2 outage on the railroad, establishes notification and call-out  
3 procedures and procedures for dissemination of vital  
4 information, provides for the development of temporary and  
5 permanent repair plans including the establishment of time  
6 estimates for both party's operations, and provides for  
7 after-incident lessons learned reviews. This advanced planning  
8 tool has helped us recover power in the wake of previous storms  
9 and outages including Hurricane Irene, blizzards, snowstorms and  
10 other weather events.

11 As Super Storm Sandy approached and the magnitude of the  
12 event became apparent, under the leadership of Governor Andrew  
13 Cuomo and MTA Chairman Joseph Lhota, we suspended service MTA  
14 wide on Sunday evening at 7:00 p.m., October 28th, and took  
15 actions to protect the system from damage, moving 1,100 pieces  
16 of rolling stock to high ground, securing 294 grade crossings  
17 and de-energizing traction power and signal systems.  
18 Importantly, we also established pre-storm contacts on the power  
19 utilities activating communication lines to facilitate  
20 post-storm recovery.

21 As you know, Sandy hit the following day with unprecedented  
22 force and consequence. While I will not recount the full  
23 catalog of damage here, there were more than 600 trees and  
24 numerous utility poles down throughout our right of way. We  
25 have a total of 104 electrical substations of which 70 are in

1 LIPA territory. 24 of the 70 LIPA supplied substations were  
2 without power. Two of Amtrak's four critical East River tunnels  
3 were flooded, and several of our train yards were under water.  
4 Our Long Beach branch took the brunt of the damage reflective of  
5 the devastation experienced throughout the south shore of Long  
6 Island, and that was not the end of the destruction.

7 On November 7, a major nor'easter hit the Long Island Rail  
8 Road service area bringing high winds and unexpectedly dumping a  
9 half foot of wet, heavy snow in its wake, downing more power  
10 lines and creating additional outages.

11 In the direct aftermath of Sandy, power outages affected us  
12 on a nearly system-wide basis. We immediately began working in  
13 close concert with the utilities. Through the initial recovery  
14 period and in the aftermath of the subsequent nor'easter, Long  
15 Island Rail Road and LIPA both designated teams to work through  
16 the crisis.

17 For LIPA, this team was led by Bruce Germano, their vice  
18 president of customer services, and George Coburn from their  
19 operations group. They worked closely with our CFO Mark Young  
20 and our chief engineer Kevin Tomlinson. High level, twice daily  
21 conference calls were held between Long Island Rail Road and  
22 LIPA, focusing on restoring the transmission of power to our  
23 substations, and LIRR/LIPA joint work plan updated twice a day  
24 in writing reflected the branch by branch priorities set by Long  
25 Island Rail Road and established timeframes for LIPA's work. A

1 detailed work in progress in-cue matrix, copies of which have  
2 been provided to the commission, we wanted to make those  
3 available to you, were utilized during this period as a joint  
4 work plan, and from the storm aftermath through November 8, this  
5 was our basic procedure with LIPA.

6 In addition to these high level phone calls and numerous  
7 emails that were exchanged, there was near constant interaction  
8 between LIPA and Long Island Rail Road personnel at the field  
9 level following the work plan and in support of the Long Island  
10 Rail Road's restoration efforts.

11 Additionally, Long Island Rail Road had the opportunity to  
12 support LIPA's independent efforts to restore service to other  
13 customers providing track protection services where LIPA trucks  
14 came near the railroad's right of way.

15 Branch by branch, location by location, throughout work  
16 through our work with the power utilities, problem areas were  
17 identified, power lines were restored and substations and grade  
18 crossings were brought back into operation. Within 24 hours,  
19 Long Island Rail Road ran trains between Jamaica and Penn  
20 Station and between Penn Station -- I'm sorry, Jamaica and  
21 Atlantic terminal, Brooklyn.

22 Within 48 hours, Long Island Rail Road had service between  
23 Great Neck and Penn Station and between Ronkonkoma and Penn  
24 Station. Within 72 hours Long Island Rail Road had service on  
25 the four busiest branches, Port Washington, Ronkonkoma, Babylon

1 and Huntington.

2 Despite the great progress that was made, power outages  
3 throughout our service territory persisted following Super Storm  
4 Sandy. As I've indicated, our initial focus with LIPA had been  
5 on the restoration of transmission lines feeding our  
6 substations.

7 In areas where local power supply remained unavailable,  
8 Long Island Rail Road provided power to grade crossings with  
9 portable generators in accordance with our own preexisting  
10 emergency procedures. This allowed us to run train service even  
11 where there were lingering local power outages.

12 Power on the Long Beach branch where four substations were  
13 flooded was not restored for several weeks. However, we  
14 provided hourly diesel service to Long Beach starting November  
15 16th and we were able to provide electric train service on Long  
16 Beach branch starting on Sunday, November 25th.

17 As we did with LIPA, Long Island Rail Road maintained close  
18 contact and coordination with Con Edison during the storm and  
19 the recovery period. In Manhattan, as this commission knows,  
20 Con Edison suffered a major failure to a substation which caused  
21 power outages in the downtown and midtown areas.

22 Unfortunately, the Amtrak maintained pumps protecting the  
23 critical East River tunnels through which all our trains to and  
24 from Penn Station must pass lost power.

25 For the first time in the history of the Long Island Rail

1 Road, two of the four tunnels were catastrophically flooded as  
2 river water poured in from the Manhattan and the Queens side,  
3 severely damaging the infrastructure, primarily the signal  
4 systems.

5 While it is not clear that energized pumps would have  
6 prevented this unprecedented flooding, clearly, we would have  
7 been in a better situation had these pumps remained operational.

8 One of the two damaged tunnels returned to full service  
9 only yesterday and, until then, we were significantly limited in  
10 the number of trains we could run into Penn Station.

11 The second damaged tunnel is scheduled for service  
12 restoration this coming weekend. Long Island Rail Road  
13 employees assisted Amtrak in the signal repairs helping to speed  
14 the process and allowing us to restore the full a.m. and p.m.  
15 peak service before Christmas.

16 Super Storm Sandy was an unprecedented event. Many of Long  
17 Island Rail Road's employees were and continue to be personally  
18 affected in their own homes by flooding, wind damage, and  
19 electrical outages. But they came to work when they needed to.  
20 We expressed our appreciation to our management team and our  
21 employees for the extraordinary efforts they made and the  
22 personal sacrifices they endured in working incredibly hard to  
23 bring the railroad back to service in such a short period of  
24 time, often while dealing with their own situations at home.

25 Similarly, following the worst crisis when the need for

1 twice daily phone calls with LIPA ended, we expressed our  
2 appreciation to the LIPA team we were working with for their  
3 focused attention to the railroad's priorities, the railroad's  
4 advanced planning including establishing emergency action  
5 procedures with LIPA, paid significant dividends, and LIPA's  
6 high level and focused response to the Long Island Rail Road's  
7 specific needs and priorities allowed us to bring service back  
8 to our customers at a truly accelerated pace.

9 I thank you for the opportunity to present this testimony  
10 and would be pleased to answer any questions you have.

11 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you very much,  
12 Ms. Williams. Rob Abrams.

13 CO-CHAIR ABRAMS: So if I understand the thrust of your  
14 testimony, you're not critical of LIPA, you were pretty  
15 complimentary about their management and operations during the  
16 storm as it related to the LIRR?

17 MS. WILLIAMS: That is correct, chairman. I am here to  
18 testify in a positive way about the response that both my team  
19 and LIPA provided in managing through this storm.

20 We had an action plan. It was developed well prior to the  
21 storm. It's been used and tweaked and improved over the years  
22 and it clearly did work for Super Storm Sandy.

23 CO-CHAIR ABRAMS: So did you see any deficiency at all?  
24 Were you disappointed at any point during the couple of weeks of  
25 the storm and its aftermath about LIPA and its performance?

1 MS. WILLIAMS: I'm only speak with regard to the railroad.  
2 We had a very focused effort and the team stayed with us on that  
3 effort until we were completed. And we had expectations that we  
4 would have to handle, for example, the local power at crossings,  
5 and we continued to work with them, you know, as we wanted to  
6 really wrap up all the elements. And even at those, you know,  
7 last items, LIPA stayed with us and completed the work effort.

8 So I have to say, you know, as a recommendation, you know,  
9 to the commission, please don't fix what isn't broken. Somehow  
10 we have managed, and I'm well aware, you know, of the broad  
11 nature of some of the issues LIPA faced, with regard to being  
12 able to support our need to restore train service, which was  
13 very critical for employees trying to get to work to make sure  
14 our freight infrastructure was working, we allow, you know,  
15 freight deliveries, especially to the east end of Long Island  
16 where they're very dependent on propane for heating fuel. All  
17 of that infrastructure needs to be up and running, and our  
18 process with LIPA worked.

19 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Any other questions?

20 (No verbal response.)

21 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Ms. Williams, the Moreland  
22 Commission would truly appreciate if you actually did share with  
23 us the emergency action plan because I think that's relevant to  
24 what Ms. Shorenstein has said earlier is, that AT&T's telecom is  
25 not a priority client or get priority status for the utilities

1 like the Long Island Rail Road did, so that would be something  
2 interesting for us to take a look at to see if that should be  
3 applied across the board to critical infrastructure.

4 But thank you so much for your testimony this evening.

5 MS. WILLIAMS: Certainly.

6 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Next up is Matt Cordaro and  
7 then, after that, Peter Scalzi and Jonny Flaherty.

8 I do want to mention a few things. One is, we also have  
9 staff here from the Department of Financial Services that deals  
10 with -- that works with homeowners on insurance. We want to  
11 make sure if there are participants that joined us this evening  
12 that have insurance related questions related to their home and  
13 how it was affected by Sandy, that they would be able to speak  
14 with someone from the state, Department of Financial Services,  
15 and they're right back there behind the folding wall over there,  
16 the barrier.

17 Also, as a reminder, as the hours get late and you don't  
18 hear your name being ticked down as far as on deck and if you  
19 have to leave, there are stenographers here, they're actually  
20 not on this floor, you got to go up the elevator and then over  
21 to the left, but they're in that room right there.

22 Thank you very much. Mr. Cordaro.

23 MR. CORDARO: Thank you. My name is Dr. Matthew Cordaro,  
24 chairman of the Suffolk County's LIPA Oversight Committee, and a  
25 former senior utility executive with over 40 years of experience

1 in dealing with emergency planning and the restoration of  
2 electric service following many types of interruptions. For  
3 your information, there's a one page bio attached to my full  
4 statement which I submitted to the reporter, but we'll depart  
5 from in the interest of time.

6 Simply stated, LIPA just did not perform acceptably during  
7 Hurricane Sandy. The root causes for this include the absence  
8 of meaningful, regulatory oversight, and the unusual utility  
9 business structure which relies on a major contractor to operate  
10 its system, which is unmatched at any utility in the United  
11 States.

12 Up to now, there has been no formal regulatory review of  
13 the adequacy of LIPA's preparations for storms and no evaluation  
14 of the utility's performance in restoring service or in  
15 following up on lessons learned.

16 In addition, LIPA's odd and unique organizational structure  
17 creates confusion on accountability, control and communications,  
18 as well as questions on who is responsible for what during  
19 storms.

20 Following a public outcry in the wake of Tropical Storm  
21 Irene, Governor Cuomo did request the PSC to coordinate a review  
22 of LIPA's performance during that storm. For this purpose, the  
23 PSC did retain a consultant and, the end result was a report  
24 which produced 100 findings and recommendations which very  
25 closely mirrored findings of the LIPA Oversight Committee which

1 were previously provided.

2 The results -- well, the interesting thing about that is  
3 that, glaringly, many of LIPA's specific shortcomings in  
4 responding to Hurricane Sandy duplicate exactly what was seen in  
5 Irene. Again, severe problems with communication and a  
6 deficient outage management system plagued the utility, the  
7 band-aids LIPA applied in these areas following Irene simply did  
8 not work. In fact, at one point during Sandy, the utility had  
9 to abandon its patched outage management system.

10 The results of substandard tree trimming and storm  
11 hardening programs also produced significant damage to  
12 transmission and substations. As a consequence LIPA was not  
13 able to restore large numbers of customers in the first days  
14 following the storm which usually occurs with the rapid repair  
15 of transmission lines and substations in most other storms.

16 This no doubt significantly extended the amount of time it  
17 took LIPA to restore most of its system. The answer to why LIPA  
18 has not implemented corrective measures from experience with  
19 previous storms, may be because it is not subject to regulatory  
20 oversight and operates with an organization structure unlike any  
21 other public utility in the country. In whatever form LIPA  
22 ultimately takes, it should be subject to regulatory oversight.

23 In addition, LIPA should be reorganized as a full service  
24 municipal utility. Under this structure, the utility would be  
25 lead by professional management overseeing all functions to be

1 carried out by LIPA workers and not major outside contractors.  
2 Such reform would remedy many of the problems LIPA now  
3 encounters in storm situations by establishing clear  
4 accountability and control while providing a means to ensure a  
5 timely communication and operational efficiency.

6 Full service municipalization is the best and most  
7 realistic option for LIPA reform. It would provide operational  
8 improvements similar to privatization without privatization's  
9 higher costs. The transition to this ownership form can also be  
10 achieved quite rapidly without major legislation.

11 Clearly, the severity of Sandy would have presented a  
12 challenge to even the most prepared and well-run utility.  
13 Nevertheless, LIPA's performance in response to this storm was  
14 obviously unacceptable. To correct this problem, it is  
15 essential that the authority become regulated and restructured  
16 as a full service municipal utility.

17 Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you.

18 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you very much and  
19 thank for your testimony. We know it was longer, so we'll be  
20 sharing it with the entire Moreland Commission as well.

21 Next up is Peter Scalzi, thereafter, Jonny Flaherty, and  
22 third is Michael Gendron.

23 MR. GREEN: Can I ask that the next speakers, who know who  
24 they are, come forward now and sit in the reserve seats so  
25 you're ready to go?

1 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Yes. For the interest of  
2 time, we have over 20 registered speakers, so we want to make  
3 sure this operates efficiently. I am now going to start the  
4 timer, so for those folks who are speaking, you will see a timer  
5 in front of you, and at a certain point, I think with 30 seconds  
6 left, you get a little yellow light.

7 MR. SCALZI: Thank you very much.

8 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you.

9 MR. SCALZI: My name is Peter Scalzi. I've lived on Long  
10 Island all my life. I've spent six years in the military. I've  
11 had a full time benefit job and left that to go into the  
12 military. President Kennedy was one of my idols. I felt I  
13 wanted to serve, do something.

14 I want to share with you something that was said about me,  
15 and there's a very important reason why I'm doing this, because  
16 it's not really about me. It's a letter of commendation,  
17 commanding officer fleet, anti-submarine warfare training center  
18 facility. I know the qualities of alertness, decisiveness,  
19 genuine concern for the welfare of your fellow human beings.  
20 Your display will continue to be evident in future years, I  
21 extend to you my sincere well done. That was very true. 2003,  
22 after the blackout, I work for subcontractors with the utility,  
23 WarRat, Hinkel McCoy, Asplundh. I was not a lineman, but I have  
24 electrical background, electronics. When I went in the service,  
25 it was advanced electronics I went into. I worked for an

1 electrician. My favorite thing to do for an electrician was to  
2 rough a new home, the frame. I loved it. I was a flagman for  
3 the utility. After the blackout in 2003, I had seen for years  
4 great great people. Some of the greatest people I ever met  
5 worked for the utility, but I seen something, a morale compass  
6 going array. It can happen to any of us. It can easily happen  
7 to me. I am very impure. I tried my best. I see my time is  
8 up. I just want to say that, I reached out to political people,  
9 I reached out to the newspapers. I tried to stop something that  
10 we're addressing, storm restoration funds and how they were  
11 absconded in many different forms. When I read in the newspaper  
12 about hurricane -- Storm Earl, Tropical Storm Earl, that missed  
13 us. They did find that there was \$1.1 million that was kicked  
14 back, that LIPA didn't have to pay, and I felt good because  
15 that's what I was hoping for back in 2003.

16 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Mr. Scalzi, I'm sorry, I  
17 don't mean to cut you off. What we do want to do is also get an  
18 opportunity to read and listen to your other testimony. Because  
19 we do have a long list of people and I do apologize, but you can  
20 also go to another room or also submit your testimony as well,  
21 but we need to get the next speaker and, most importantly, thank  
22 you so much for your service to this country. Thank you.

23 Jonny Flaherty, and after that Michael Gendron, and  
24 thereafter, Nassau County Legislator Dave Denenberg.

25 MR. FLAHERTY: My name is Dennis Laherty and I'm known as

1 Joey Flaherty. I'm the chief electrical inspector for  
2 electrical inspection service. I was one of those inspectors  
3 who was in Freeport, Nassau and Suffolk County, and I kind of  
4 saw the inspections from the other end from what the politicians  
5 saw it.

6 I also do some writing and I wrote a news article called  
7 "Electrical Safety After Sandy" and I sent it to LIPA, and that  
8 was on Wednesday, storm was on Tuesday and Wednesday. LIPA  
9 called me back and they wanted to discuss it and we discussed  
10 that this was not a normal storm with flood waters. There's a  
11 lot of articles on the internet about flood waters. Flood  
12 waters of the United States are normally what we see in the  
13 midwest. There's usually rain water, rain water runoff. That  
14 is not what we experienced here. What we experienced here was  
15 salt water. Salt water mixed with oil, fuel oil, salt water  
16 mixed with lawn fertilizer and insecticides and road runoff and  
17 all kinds of junk. It's not the same as regular salt water.

18 So when I was speaking to LIPA, you know, we more or less  
19 decided that the best alternative was to not connect to anything  
20 unless it was looked at by a certified electrical inspector. We  
21 had no idea of the magnitude of what was out there, but the  
22 decision not to do it until it was looked at by an inspector was  
23 made because we know that there are other people out there, I  
24 don't mean this negatively, but there are electricians out there  
25 who really are not qualified to make that decision. Most

1 electricians are, several that are not. So the decision was  
2 made.

3 So LIPA decided this and Freeport Power also decided this.  
4 And this is primarily -- I mean this thing is ticking down and I  
5 don't think I'm going to get done with this, but the difference  
6 is that, in Freeport, the inspections were done in an orderly  
7 way. We had the utility working with us and we got through it,  
8 over two days we did 4,000 inspections of homes, and everything,  
9 you know, worked out pretty good.

10 What happened in Suffolk and -- first in Suffolk then in  
11 Nassau, LIPA did not call the punches, it was really Suffolk  
12 County called the punches and then the municipalities, Babylon  
13 it was first. And what we found is we were really -- it was so  
14 disorganized that we couldn't get anything done.

15 The first day we spent half the day waiting for people,  
16 jockeying for positions, and we did some inspections, did quite  
17 a few of them, and by the third day we found out ourselves  
18 instead of doing it in a systemic manner, what we were doing we  
19 were going to political, you know, give you an example, one time  
20 I was called off, I had to go inspect a judge's house.

21 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Mr. Flaherty, I do  
22 apologize, I'm sorry, but we would like to hear your testimony  
23 more, so, again, if you want to continue providing testimony for  
24 the record, please continue.

25 MR. FLAHERTY: Thank you.

1 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Next up is Michael Gendron,  
2 and thereafter Nassau County Legislator Dave Denenberg, and,  
3 thereafter, Councilman Mark Cuthbertson.

4 MR. GENDRON: Good evening. I want to thank the Moreland  
5 Commission for the opportunity to speak this evening about the  
6 performance of the utilities after Hurricane Sandy.

7 More specifically, I'm here to comment about the  
8 performance of the utilities that provide telecom, cable, and  
9 internet services. They performed abysmally. We had the vast  
10 majority of our residents in the region left, cut off and  
11 isolated from family and emergency services in the aftermath of  
12 this natural disaster. That isolation and detachment from the  
13 outside world was especially dangerous and unsettling for the  
14 most vulnerable segments of our communities.

15 This was not always the case. Years ago when the lights  
16 went out, you could always count on having a working phone.  
17 That's because Verizon's phone lines over the copper network was  
18 self reliant with their own backup generators and batteries to  
19 power the phone lines. The problem today with that copper  
20 network is that it has not seen any appreciable investment in  
21 over 10 years. In you live in a non-Fios area, this is your  
22 only option.

23 Double poles left by Verizon and Cablevision, 12,000 in  
24 Suffolk County alone were partially responsible for the outages,  
25 both power and telecom that our residents suffered because of

1 Sandy.

2 When the PSC relaxed their standards in 2005, it helped to  
3 facilitate the proliferation of the broken rotted poles that  
4 assisted in the network's devastation. The relaxation of the  
5 PSC standards helped to pave the way for Verizon's reduction in  
6 their workforce.

7 This loss of the dedicated men and women who worked on the  
8 network also allowed the buildup of double poles and  
9 deteriorated plan. This has all been documented in a filing to  
10 the PSC by our Attorney General, Eric Snyderman.

11 Verizon's Fios network has one main floor. If the power  
12 goes out, their battery backup lasts four to eight hours. The  
13 average person suffered a loss of power that lasted one to two  
14 weeks. This Fios network must be held to the same standard as  
15 their copper network. Self reliance from the local power  
16 company.

17 The local cable company such as Cablevision and Time Warner  
18 are completely reliant on the local power company for their  
19 services to be operable. If you lost power, you lost phone,  
20 cable, and internet. No power, complete isolation.

21 Wireless companies performed the worst. There were  
22 sporadic and spotty service, if you had any service at all. The  
23 cell towers shut down without power from the local power  
24 company. This reliance on the local power grid is a two fold  
25 problem though. Even if the cell tower was powered up, if you

1 were without power at home, you had problems with charging your  
2 cell phone and tablets, and who has two hours to spend at some  
3 government office to charge their phone every day?

4 Verizon needs to announce its intent to provide home  
5 service over their wireless network.

6 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Mr. Gendron, can you wrap  
7 up the testimony? We'll certainly take your written testimony  
8 thereafter.

9 MR. GENDRON: Okay. Thank you. With the poor performance  
10 of wireless, this is the wrong direction for Verizon to go.  
11 I'll finish up.

12 The time is now. While these experiences are still fresh  
13 in our minds to go back to Verizon and all the cable companies  
14 to fix this and to provide a more secure service that the  
15 residents of New York can rely on in times of natural  
16 emergencies.

17 There is also time for the PSC to get back to insuring  
18 certain service standards and planned conditions. If  
19 competition can't ensure this, then regulation can. It did  
20 before, and certainly can do it again. Thank you.

21 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you very much, Mr.  
22 Gendron. The next speaker is Nassau County Legislator Dave  
23 Denenberg and, thereafter, Mark Cuthbertson, then Edward Newman,  
24 Randy Perlmutter, and Phil Healey.

25 I do want to remind the speakers that the focus of the

1 Moreland Commission is fact find specific to its charge and the  
2 charge of the Moreland Commission is to make recommendations on  
3 restructuring the state energy agencies, restructuring LIPA and  
4 dealing with monopolies as utilities so we're looking for you to  
5 give recommendations on that specifically in your testimony or  
6 comment on the -- or provide insight on the utility's emergency  
7 response, I mean, emergency management planning and storm  
8 response. Thank you.

9 LEGISLATOR DENENBERG: Thank you. Thank you for having  
10 this hearing and serving. If you would permit me a little bit  
11 of indulgence. I've spent two weeks nonstop in my district with  
12 about three hours of sleep so this is what I saw firsthand.

13 People understood that a natural disaster was going to put  
14 power out for a long period of time. People were smart. What  
15 they didn't understand was the lack of information, the  
16 misinformation, the inaccurate information, the finger pointing.  
17 Not just LIPA, not just National Grid, but government. Everyone  
18 pointing fingers. Everyone saying, I'm going to hold you  
19 accountable, and then you're wondering what is LIPA?

20 LIPA is a state authority. It came in because a private  
21 monopoly, LILCO, gave us the highest rates in the country and  
22 never invested in the very infrastructure that one of you asked  
23 the county executive, would people understand that they have to  
24 pay for infrastructure improvements? If you give people the  
25 information, maybe they would understand. But no one is giving

1       them the information at a cost to bury the lines on the north  
2       shore away from the south shore.

3             My district, which covers Bellmore, Merrick, Freeport,  
4       Wantage, the underground lines in Bellmore had salt water  
5       infiltration. It was almost ironic that the one underground  
6       lines were closest to the water. You almost couldn't make up  
7       that kind of poor planning.

8             But the inspection process, Thursday night, the first  
9       Thursday after staying up, no sleep, I'm with a LIPA director  
10      going to the south shore of Wantagh, then Merrick and Bellmore  
11      and he turns around and says to me, "Well, of course none of  
12      these houses are going to come back until there's an  
13      inspection." I said, "Huh? You guys better call Mike Hervey."

14            I learned that Thursday night that Mr. Hervey was going to  
15      require some type of inspection. I said, have -- which the  
16      town's were going to do, he said, "The towns will do them." I  
17      said, "Did you tell the towns?" "No." "When are you going to  
18      tell them?" "We have a conference tomorrow."

19            I said, "I can tell you the Town of Hempstead isn't going  
20      to cooperate with this and the county's probably not even going  
21      to be at the meeting." Sounds like Suffolk agreed to help and  
22      paid the price for trying to help.

23            But the same time, let me finish this, I had gone to an  
24      emergency management meeting that day with Freeport which had a  
25      plan and the only way to do these inspections. Have the

1 electric company with the inspector when the power was ready to  
2 go on and make sure you hit it during the weekend when people  
3 were home. And if someone was okay, the light comes back on.  
4 If they're not okay, you give them a contractor who can come, a  
5 licensed electrician who can come and make the reparations.

6 If they're not home, you have to shut off the meter.  
7 Otherwise, everyone's waiting weeks for people who are evacuated  
8 to come home. When I heard this, you can imagine how shocked I  
9 was. I'll be really quick.

10 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you.

11 LEGISLATOR DENENBERG: It's not just the lack of  
12 information again from LIPA, sewage treatment plants go out, no  
13 one knows. Health departments don't go down. There really  
14 needed to be, you know, more information at all levels.

15 And, remember, the catch 22, to answer the question you  
16 just said, Ms. Calcaterra, what do you do? Part of the problem  
17 here is, when do you call in and make the expenditure on  
18 out-of-state crews? When do you call them?

19 If you call them ahead of time two years ago everyone  
20 wanted a hearing because LIPA called in too many people ahead of  
21 time.

22 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Mr. Denenberg, thank you  
23 very much for your testimony. It's greatly appreciated. I  
24 mean, Legislator Denenberg. Next up is Councilman Mark  
25 Cuthbertson, thereafter Edward Newman, Randy Perlmutter, Phil

1 Healey and Pedro Quintanilla.

2 LEGISLATOR DENENBERG: Can I just say, I'm handing in  
3 something?

4 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Please. Absolutely. And  
5 you can hand it in in that direction. Councilman.

6 COUNCILMAN CUTHBERTSON: Thank you to the members of the  
7 commission and thank you for the opportunity. I don't have  
8 prepared remarks, so I'm hoping to be under your two-minute  
9 limit.

10 I would tell you that my purpose today is not to give you  
11 the town's war stories or to be a part of a collective pile-on  
12 on LIPA. I have four quick points I would like to make in the  
13 area of assessments, communication, taking advantage of local  
14 resources and underground wires.

15 When it comes to assessments, it seems in the aftermath of  
16 this that there was just a failure of assessing the situation  
17 when it came from the utility's perspective. I share with you  
18 the story of five days into the storm, a DOT person from upstate  
19 was in my block making an initial assessment of the storm damage  
20 and what needed to be done. It did not appear that there were  
21 priorities being determined, and people weren't told how  
22 priorities were being determined.

23 I think County Executive Bellone made a very good point  
24 that people can withstand a lot of hardship if there's an  
25 expectation. But I would also say that people can plan if

1 there's an expectation. They can plan to secure their home and  
2 leave town. They can plan to stay out of town if they know and  
3 have some idea of what the expectation should be, which brings  
4 us to communication.

5 I think, if nothing else, this was, among other things, an  
6 epic failure of communication. LIPA had put together a texting  
7 function that they were touting before this storm. It just made  
8 matters worse. There are many ways to leverage technology.  
9 That has to be an important part of this. Taking advantage of  
10 local resources, as opposed to the Long Island Rail Road's  
11 experience, there was no meaningful action plan for coordinating  
12 locate local resources. We divide our town into 23 snow removal  
13 districts. There was never talk about how to go about fanning  
14 out in the town. Underground wires could occupy hours not just  
15 minutes, so I would say I hope the commission looks at this and  
16 conclude with this.

17 As a town official, I had a hope before Irene that 10 years  
18 of tree trimming would allow us to avoid what happened with  
19 Hurricane Gloria. That wasn't the case. Before Super Storm  
20 Sandy, I had a hope that the lessons of Irene had been learned  
21 and that the weak trees were down and we wouldn't have the same  
22 problems. Unfortunately, it was worse.

23 My hope is that through your good work, the next time we  
24 have a storm of this proportion, that we are prepared and there  
25 is much less economic, physical, and emotional dislocation.

1 Thank you.

2 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you very much,  
3 councilman. And, councilman, for the record, for the  
4 commissioners that are not from Suffolk County, can you please  
5 just state what town you represent?

6 COUNCILMAN CUTHBERTSON: I'm councilman with the town of  
7 Huntington.

8 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Perfect. Thank you so very  
9 much. Next up is Edward Newman, on deck is Randy Perlmutter,  
10 then, after that Phil Healey.

11 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Phil left.

12 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Phil left. Okay. So after  
13 that would be Pedro Quintanilla, Mr. Newman. It would also be  
14 helpful if you're affiliated with an organization, if you  
15 identify what that organization is. Thank you.

16 MR. NEWMAN: My name is Edward Newman. I'm a licensed  
17 master electrical contractor, licensed in multiple states and  
18 I'm vice president of IBW Electrical Construction Company.

19 I'm going to save you the war stories. I live on the water  
20 in Bay Shore. It was a mess. Here's my LIPA plan:

21 Create a new entity, a customer owned cooperative. This  
22 has been successful in many other parts of the country. This  
23 will allow a fresh start with many benefits. Maintain the  
24 current ownership by the people. No shareholders to put profits  
25 over the people. As a private entity, it avoids restrictive

1 public bidding laws and other unfunded mandates. We need to  
2 escape from the horrific power purchase agreements still in  
3 place from the LILCO days.

4 This is a tough one. We need relief from the Shoreham  
5 debt. Purchase all assets from existing from LIPA and it would  
6 eliminate the subcontract operating agreement model. LIPA would  
7 now directly employ all the personnel. Oversight and rate  
8 review by the New York State Public Service Commission.

9 A few things on storm preparedness. Replace all poles in  
10 120, 130 mile ICC wind zone. This is along the immediate coast,  
11 starting with the main distribution ones moving inward with  
12 reinforced concrete. Same as they do in Florida and the Gulf  
13 Coast.

14 Require all new electrical switch gear to be mounted 24  
15 inches above the FEMA flood level. Replace wooden transmission  
16 line poles with metal or reinforced concrete. Install  
17 additional load breaks. Allow further segmentation of local  
18 distribution networks.

19 Implement a wireless smart grid system to monitor power,  
20 start with the main distribution lines, eventually, transmission  
21 to meter. Every end of it.

22 Build a new state of the art energy control center, primary  
23 and backup. Implement an aggressive tree removal program.  
24 Removal, not just trimming. Implement a program to start  
25 burying main distribution lines in heavily wooded areas, but not

1 in the flood zones.

2 Require all new developments in services to bury lines,  
3 again, not in the flood zones. Develop a plan to stock pile  
4 adequate repair resources. Update utility reciprocal working  
5 agreements. Based on assumption, you won't get everybody you  
6 expect.

7 Develop local work agreements for secondary repair with IBW  
8 Local 25, Long Island NECA and other local contractors. These  
9 resources of hundreds of people in trucks sat idle including my  
10 own. They're here. There's no need to shelter them. Simple,  
11 easy stuff.

12 Update computer software for all systems, implement system  
13 wide GIS mapping with mobile client access from thin client.  
14 Update the critical facility preparedness and restoration plans.  
15 This is what AT&T spoke to you before. Everybody that needs to  
16 be on the list is not on the list. Couple of other little odds  
17 and ends, I'll save you from it and submit it.

18 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: That is absolutely perfect.  
19 Thank you so very much.

20 MR. NEWMAN: This is one page front and back. This is what  
21 needs to be done to fix the problem.

22 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: I would strongly recommend  
23 actually that you give your testimony to the stenographer just  
24 right behind if anyone has extra testimony they didn't get to,  
25 share it with the stenographer so we make sure that it's

1 reflected in the record.

2 MR. NEWMAN: That's what I'll do.

3 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you. Mr. Randy  
4 Perlmutter, thereafter Pedro Quintanilla, and then Steve Silver.  
5 Is Randy here? Okay. Pedro Quintanilla, thank you. Then Steve  
6 Silver and then Seymour Spiegel.

7 MR. QUINTANILLA: Good evening all. My name is Pedro  
8 Quintanilla. I'm a resident in the Village of Westbury, 10  
9 minutes away. Alumni here in SUNY Old Westbury, very proud of  
10 it.

11 I lost power for eight days. My family suffered  
12 tremendously without power in the cold. As well as thousands of  
13 my neighbors. I am also chairperson of LICAN, Long Island  
14 Congregations Associations Neighborhoods Organization. We are a  
15 multi-faith, multi-racial, non-partisan power organization which  
16 represents about 35,000 residents of Long Island from 19  
17 congregations and organizations. We work to uncover what keeps  
18 our folks up at night and what struggles to deal with. And  
19 Sandy was a real struggle:

20 LICAN works to hold public officials and corporate  
21 officials accountable to deliver under responsibilities,  
22 obligations and commitments. We feel that when it comes to  
23 government, it hasn't quite delivered.

24 Many of our LICAN members, as well as thousands of other  
25 Long Islanders, have been affected severely with the lengthy

1 power outages due to Sandy and Irene as well as suffered  
2 personal property damage and health issues.

3 We are here to make sure that Long Islanders finally get a  
4 power company that is accountable to its customers, that is  
5 prepared to restore service rapidly and provides true  
6 transparency. Thank you.

7 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you so much very much  
8 for your testimony. Truly appreciate it. Next is Steve Silver.  
9 Is Steve Silver here? And then Seymour Spiegel and then Leon  
10 Clivizand, and then Jeff Greenfield. Steve Silver? Seymour  
11 Spiegel? Then Leon Clivizand and Jeff Greenfield.

12 MR. SPIEGEL: Good evening, and thank you to the commission  
13 for giving me this opportunity to speak tonight. My name is  
14 Seymour Spiegel. I live in Jericho in Nassau County.

15 My experience of Hurricane Sandy can be summed up by a  
16 series of numbers. 14 days that we went without heat or light.  
17 We felt cold, dark and abandoned. The system, LIPA, and  
18 government, failed us. 11 days before our neighborhood saw the  
19 first tree truck. 46, the degrees the low temperature in my  
20 house, so cold I could see my breath indoors. 39 seconds  
21 according to the New York Times that the LIPA board spent  
22 discussing Sandy four days prior to the storm. How can that be  
23 explained?

24 4,225, the number of broken LIPA utility poles. Four hours  
25 minimum time to replace one down pole. A down pole on my

1 circuit took an entire day to replace. Technologies exist to  
2 strengthen poles at moderate cost.

3 2006, the day of the report commissioned by LIPA warning  
4 that LIPA needed to harden its grid. Since then, LIPA has spent  
5 less money than promised on pole inspection and tree trimming.

6 \$950 million, LIPA's estimated cost of restoration of power  
7 according to Newsday, three times that of PSE&G in New Jersey  
8 which had twice as many outages. This highlights the poor  
9 condition of LIPA's infrastructure before Sandy.

10 We had a 21st Century storm, but a 19th Century power  
11 company. I saw LIPA surveyors after Sandy going house to house,  
12 recording damage with pencil and paper when 4G tablets are  
13 available.

14 This is 2012. Climate scientists say that we can expect  
15 more severe weather than in the past. We have had two  
16 devastating storms in the past 14 months. Changes are urgently  
17 needed now before the next Sandy. Thank you.

18 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you very much. Leon  
19 Clivizand? Jeff Greenfield. After Jeff Greenfield we have  
20 Richard Serchuk, and after that Robert Ordan.

21 MR. GREENFIELD: Good evening, commissioners. Thank you  
22 for the opportunity to appear here. Jeff Greenfield, citizen  
23 taxpayer, ratepayer, appearing as vice president of Lynbrook  
24 Chamber of Commerce on behalf of the merchants of Atlantic  
25 Avenue who endured 12 days blacked out with no business in what

1 is a vibrant business community.

2 It's ironic that I'm here on the eve of 12-12-12 and I have  
3 to talk to you about 12 days of no power. Throughout the  
4 ordeal, when LIPA did nothing slowly to help the business  
5 community of Lynbrook, the communications left a lot to be  
6 desired, and, when they finally arrived at the scene, it was a  
7 few hours to hook everyone up because there's a substation  
8 located in our downtown to service the area. Everyone was  
9 confused and perplexed as to why the unnecessary delay. Lesson  
10 learned, we would rather be dealing in a de-centralized system  
11 where they, Hewlett office, which serves our area, knows us  
12 better, would be better equipped to service hurricane response,  
13 rather than calling headquarters, which was out of touch, out of  
14 town and out of realty.

15 Let's fix the problem, not by fining LIPA, because we the  
16 ratepayers would have to pay the fine, but by forcing them any  
17 future operator going to a decentralized system of storm  
18 reporting.

19 I'm also appearing on behalf of my 88 year old widowed  
20 mother living alone in the Windham in Garden City. Last year  
21 during Hurricane Irene and, again, this year, she endured 10 to  
22 12 days of no power. She must twice a day use a nebulizer for  
23 breathing to treat her chronic bronchial asthma.

24 When I reported the outage last year to LIPA, they had no  
25 idea that there were senior citizens in the complex and, worse

1 than that, their records showed it as being in Queens because  
2 the managing agent gets the bill in his Queens office.

3 This year's storm response was not much better and they  
4 didn't do anything to improve response. Lesson learned, let's  
5 prioritize senior citizen complexes.

6 Finally, let's salute the volunteer fire service, our first  
7 responders, who were on the street first, who rescued people,  
8 who cleared the way for the LIPA crews and the tree trimmers to  
9 make their way to do their work. These first responders, my  
10 department, others, went into the areas of Long Beach, Atlantic  
11 Beach, and we could communicate. And I don't understand in this  
12 day and age, in a post 9/11 era, why there's any excuse why the  
13 out of town crews couldn't communicate with the LIPA crews and  
14 there's no mutual aid ban or channel. The fire service has  
15 mutual aid bans. We can communicate all across New York State.  
16 We've gone into other areas. That has to be a priority of this  
17 commission.

18 Also, a final note, a thank you, as an insurance agent, to  
19 the Department of Financial Services and the Superintendent Ben  
20 Lawsky for being there on the ground in the affected areas to  
21 help policyholders. So, thank you.

22 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you very much,  
23 Mr. Greenfield. Next up is Richard Serchuk, is he here? And  
24 then after Mr. Serchuk is going to be Robert Ordan. Is he here?  
25 Great. If you can come on up and be prepared. After that is

1 going to be Claudia Borecky. Is Ms. Borecky still here? You  
2 can come on up in the reserve seats.

3 Thank you so much.

4 MR. SERCHUK: My name is Mr. Richard Serchuk. I have been  
5 a disaster responder federally and locally in the past. In this  
6 particular case, I was a disaster victim. I was out of power in  
7 my home for 12 days, two and a half weeks for my office.

8 I am requesting the Moreland Commission to consider  
9 something similar to the family assistance act that was created  
10 after Flight 800, the tragedy that occurred off the coast here  
11 in 1996. Where the family assistance centers, and I use that  
12 plural in the disaster of this magnitude, that we would be able  
13 to go to the center. I had no power. I had no cell phone. I  
14 had no text. I had no internet. I had no way of communicating  
15 with anyone.

16 Had I had a center that I could approach and enter and get  
17 real-time updates as to what the repair rate would be, I could  
18 handle that. With not being knowing when my office would be  
19 able to reopen, when not knowing when my family would be safe in  
20 their home, I would be able to justify whether I should leave  
21 the Island or stay. I could then return either to my practice  
22 or become a responder again as I have done in the past.

23 I think that their disaster plan was a complete failure.  
24 The fact that they were un-scalable in their needs, the fact  
25 that they could not handle salt water intrusions, the fact that

1 they could not handle the expansion of the operation's section  
2 to know where their personnel was, to know that someone would  
3 have a hunch in order to contact their mutual aid in order to  
4 bring in outside resources is unfathomable in this environment.

5 ICS has been around for too many years that they should  
6 then turnaround and state that they had no idea where their  
7 personnel is in operations. I think that their system needs to  
8 be revamped. I think that mutual aid needs to be worked on and  
9 their disaster plan just needs to be completely revamped and  
10 needs to be accountable to some sort of a regulatory system.

11 Unfortunately, we don't have regulations in this  
12 environment, but maybe they need to have a regulation. Thank  
13 you.

14 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you so very much for  
15 your testimony this evening, Mr. Serchuk. Next up is Robert  
16 Ordan, and then Claudia Borecky, and thereafter is Ghenya Grant.  
17 Is Ghenya here? So after that would be Annette Kors. Is Ms.  
18 Kors still here? After that Mark Kors? They may have left  
19 together. Okay. Kors is here. Great. So if you can come on  
20 up on deck I would greatly appreciate it.

21 Mr. Ordan, thank you.

22 MR. ORDAN: Hi. My name is Bob Ordan. I manage two beach  
23 clubs in Breezy Point, Queens, and I've been an EMT for about 30  
24 years. I think everyone needs to realize that this was an  
25 unprecedented disaster. We haven't seen anything like this

1 before. There's no question that we need to plan better and  
2 move ahead.

3 But I can tell you from observing the LIPA crews in the  
4 Breezy Point area and in my neighborhood in Lynnbrook,  
5 coordinating with the outside contractors, I think they did an  
6 excellent job. They restored our service within about a week at  
7 both locations. I don't know what people expected. We have  
8 hospitals that are still closed. I think LIPA overall  
9 responded. That's pretty much it.

10 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you very much, Mr.  
11 Ordan. Next up is Ms. Borecky. I understand that Ghenya Grant  
12 is not here but Ms. Kors is here, so you will be next. Thank  
13 you.

14 MS. BORECKY: My name may Claudia Borecky. After Dave  
15 Denenberg's disaster relief forum that he was holding throughout  
16 Nassau throughout his district, some people stayed behind to  
17 develop a strategic plan to address the problems that our  
18 communities experienced with regard to Hurricane Sandy and its  
19 after effects.

20 We formed a task force, Legislator Denenberg's Response  
21 Task Force to address these problems and to ensure that viable  
22 solutions are reached to prevent this disaster from wreaking  
23 havoc on our lives in the future.

24 What I'll speak about today is only the part that refers to  
25 LIPA, the failures of LIPA, since that's what the Moreland

1 Commission is concerned with.

2 I'll just briefly say that basically the loss of power, and  
3 some of the solutions that we came -- we thought of were  
4 mentioned tonight, underground wiring in areas that are not in  
5 flood zones.

6 Also, there's an article here which I am going to hand into  
7 you about how to avoid the next Sandy meltdown, and it's very  
8 interesting, different ways of providing electricity, because  
9 LIPA, of course, the electricity has to be used when it's  
10 produced, and in our areas have electricity power sources that  
11 can store the electricity. So when a power goes out, it's its  
12 own backup.

13 On a more local level, it would help to have the traffic  
14 signals have solar power with battery packs because that was a  
15 very big problem and it was very unsafe, and it was a reason why  
16 some of the schools didn't go back because the children, the  
17 buses couldn't get, you know, it was very dangerous traveling so  
18 that was another suggestion we came up with.

19 Obviously we had a lack of communication in information,  
20 and poor coordination between LIPA National Guard, the tree  
21 trimming crews and the outside contractors.

22 And the poor evacuation preparation plan. I'm not going to  
23 read all of our suggestions, but I would ask you to look at it  
24 at another time. I'll hand it in to you now.

25 We'd like to be considered part of the conversation. This

1 is a group of communities, they were affected, these people were  
2 badly affected by this, and some of their ideas are very good  
3 and we can work on that issue.

4 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you very much. Much  
5 appreciated. Thank you. Next up is Annette Kors and then  
6 Joseph Sadowski. Is Mr. Sadowski still here? Please come on up  
7 because you're on deck. And then Neil Lewis. Is Mr. Lewis  
8 still here? Thank you. You can come on up.

9 What's important again is that, when you speak if you're  
10 affiliated with an organization, if you mention what that  
11 affiliation is and, again, just to remind the speakers, the  
12 Moreland Commission has charges and the charges have to do with  
13 coming up with a report that, in recommendations the governor  
14 wants us to come up with, on either restructuring state energy  
15 agencies, dealing with utilities as monopolies, restructuring  
16 LIPA, or, alternatively, we're also investigating the emergency  
17 preparedness and storm response of the utilities as well. So  
18 we're looked for commentary on that. Ms. Kors, thank you for  
19 allowing me to speak for a moment. Please begin.

20 MS. KORZEN: Not a problem.

21 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you so much.

22 MS. KORZEN: I'm just an everyday citizen. I'm a native of  
23 Hicksville. My last name was actually misspelled, my last name  
24 is actually Korzen.

25 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Sorry.

1 MS. KORZEN: I just simply wanted to say that there is a  
2 Department of Emergency Management, and it's overseen by the  
3 politicians, and as much as we want to pass the buck or at least  
4 blame LIPA for doing a horrible job, I do believe that the  
5 politicians in our local counties have had an opportunity to  
6 basically ensure that, if an emergency such as a hurricane were  
7 to occur, there would be some sort of oversight prior to a storm  
8 like this happening. I think there has been a lack thereof.

9 The second point that I just happened to observe while I  
10 was here today was the commission itself. My concerns are  
11 simply the level of expertise with regard to structural  
12 engineers or those individuals that are on the front line  
13 actually coming up with the solutions because they were there.  
14 They know what didn't work. They know what has worked. They're  
15 the ones that are on the forefront. I think that is something  
16 that I would think is a good enough suggestion to present to the  
17 commission that, maybe in the future, there can be a commission  
18 consisting of front-line people that actually went through that,  
19 have the expertise, the knowledge, the educational background to  
20 come up with an actual emergency preparedness plan, I guess, so  
21 that we wouldn't have to go through something like this again.  
22 That's it. Thank you.

23 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you very much  
24 Ms. Korzen. Next up is Joseph Sadowski and then, after that,  
25 Neil Lewis.

1 MR. SADOWSKI: Good evening. I'm going to do this fast.  
2 First I've heard Long Island Rail Road here praising LIPA. They  
3 have to praise LIPA, it's very simple because we've had no  
4 service for the railroad. We couldn't go back and forth to  
5 work. Couldn't get in the city, couldn't do anything. The  
6 reason for that was the MTA allowed 99.9 percent of the diesel  
7 engines to be sold. Anybody ever hear when we were younger?  
8 I'm 61, we never had trains where the whole system goes down.  
9 Never. Diesel engines will go in the snow, will go through a  
10 snowstorm. A diesel engine will go through a hurricane.  
11 Nothing stops a diesel engine. We get four inches of snow, the  
12 whole system is down. But the governor at the time allowed the  
13 engines to be sold, so we lose it.

14 Now, I did some research and some studying. We had a  
15 couple of people we got together. Sprinkler systems, if you  
16 noticed all the trees that got blown down with the root system  
17 intact, 90 percent all had sprinkler systems within 20 feet of  
18 the trunk. When a tree grows, it has roots, it goes straight  
19 down looking for water. If you have water on the top, you then  
20 have a top root system, which means an average heavy wind is  
21 enough to blow any tree over. It's very simple.

22 Now, we'll move on to the next one. LIPA, my own personal  
23 experience here, I live in Hicksville, seven blocks away from  
24 the main office, the plant. If you look through my backyard can  
25 you see LIPA. But it takes seven blocks of power lines to get

1 to my house. My power was back on within 24 hours. Thank you.

2 Within two days, LIPA sent their trucks out, the guys who  
3 cut up the trees that have fallen, because the first guys that  
4 went out to put the power back on just cleared the lines and  
5 hooked them up so people would have power. Now seven blocks, 24  
6 hours, that's not too bad, seven blocks. Okay?

7 Well, they came back in to do the clean up, I lost it for  
8 five days. When I went and put the power back on, I lost the  
9 refrigerator, the security system, which runs on a computer,  
10 blew out the computer, a printer and a couple of other things.  
11 The surge was so great.

12 I called up. I could not get them. I finally got in touch  
13 with them and you know what they said to me, that's not storm  
14 damage. It didn't happen at the time of the storm. So now I  
15 eat the loss, and you all know what a refrigerator costs. I eat  
16 the loss of purchasing a new refrigerator.

17 I think something seriously has to be done here. I think  
18 the politicians who have the smiles on their face when they  
19 should be bowing their heads in shame, all right, have you  
20 Mandino. Where is he? He's not here, to listen to the  
21 complaints of the public. But he was, wasn't he? He had to go  
22 home or go to cocktail hour. Thank you.

23 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you so much, Mr.  
24 Sadowski. Next up is Neil Lewis, and then after that Rose  
25 VanGuilder, and then Mike Fichtelman. Thank you.

1           Again, if you have an affiliation, it's very important that  
2 that's mentioned. Thank you.

3           MR. LEWIS: My name is Neil Lewis and I'm the executive  
4 director The Sustainability Institute of Molloy College. I also  
5 happen to be one of the eight current members of the LIPA board  
6 of trustees.

7           I think it's a great idea. I commend the governor and all  
8 of you for serving and agreeing to serve on this commission. I  
9 do hope that you're able to make some very strong  
10 recommendations after sifting through all this information.

11           I wanted to use my two minutes just to basically make two  
12 points. One is, that the LIPA board of trustees spend a lot of  
13 time analyzing the question of what would be a good structure  
14 going forward. We adopted something that's referred to as  
15 SERV-CO and, under that new structure, where it would be a  
16 public/private partnership, we also bid out the question of who  
17 would be the new company when the current contract with National  
18 Grid comes to an end, and the winner of that process was PSE&G  
19 and Lockheed Martin. It's a team effort there.

20           My point here is that I encourage you and plead with you to  
21 please look at what we've come up with under this SERV-CO model.  
22 I think it gets the best of both worlds. So when we look at the  
23 problem here which was an abysmal failure of communications in  
24 the first order, I think the idea of bringing a company like  
25 Lockheed Martin, with their experience and knowledge with

1 technology, makes a lot of sense.

2 So a public entity being able to establish policy through  
3 public decision making, but then being able to bring in the  
4 talents of a nationally recognized company like that, seems to  
5 me to be the logical best solution. So that's my main point in  
6 speaking.

7 The other point I wanted to say is that we did have a  
8 hearing at of the LIPA board in January of this year, something  
9 I asked for specifically on storm hardening, and I'm going to  
10 repeat to you the message that you I tried to get out and I just  
11 read through the transcript again, and I didn't maybe say it  
12 really well, but my point is, we should at least seek to harden  
13 the most important resources, the priority infrastructure if  
14 it's too expensive to do the whole system.

15 If we can look at ways we can do more of that, the  
16 hospitals, the train stations. A lot of people complain because  
17 they didn't see the crews. Most of the crews were working  
18 either on the substations or on those priority resources. So if  
19 there is a way to ramp up the amount of hardening for those  
20 things, then I think, aside from putting every cable underground  
21 at a very large expense, perhaps we can achieve a lot and I  
22 apologize I went over.

23 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Great. Thank you very  
24 much for your testimony, Mr. Lewis. Next up is Rose VanGuilder  
25 and then thereafter is Mike Fictelman here? Daniel Karpen? Mr.

1 Karpen? Gregory Fisher? Rose VanGuilder, thank you.

2 MS. VANGUILDER: Good evening. Thank you for being here.  
3 My only wish was that this board would be present at the LIPA  
4 board meetings that they have on a periodic basis. Because then  
5 you would know how poorly run the LIPA organization is, LIPA  
6 power company, as well as National Grid.

7 As you are well aware, the weather reports were given many  
8 days prior, and we were forewarned how terrible Sandy was going  
9 to be, and to be prepared and to make sure that you had food in  
10 advance, and to have blankets and so forth and so on. And, as  
11 that gentleman stated, the LIPA board and Mr. Michael Hervey and  
12 his group met for four days prior.

13 However, Newsday reported that LIPA was totally unprepared  
14 for this storm, totally and completely unprepared. They didn't  
15 have poles. They did not have wires. And even though they  
16 always call for crews in advance, one day in advance, and we pay  
17 for this each and every time, every tropical storm that we have  
18 had, they have always called for crews in advance. However,  
19 this time there weren't enough crews to handle the bad effects  
20 that we have.

21 The equipment that LIPA has is antiquated. Their computer  
22 system has a -- I forgot the name of it now, but it is a 20 year  
23 old system that they are using. It's in the LIPA newspaper.  
24 They were given a report by the governor's office two years ago  
25 to upgrade their system. They did not do so.

1           This is why the storm damage that took place is as great as  
2           it is, and this is why there were deaths as a result of Sandy,  
3           and homes were totally destroyed. This is why I now have my arm  
4           in a cast because my surgery was postponed four weeks. The  
5           train was not working, the subway was not working, the Long  
6           Island Rail Road was not working, and my rotary cuff that I had,  
7           the tear became 10 times as worse, and my thumb is not  
8           operating.

9           EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you very much, Ms.  
10          VanGuilder.

11          MS. VANGUILDER: And my suggestion is that we get a new  
12          utility power authority.

13          EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Perfect. Thank you so  
14          much. What I would like to do is before Mr. Finkelman comes up,  
15          I would just like to run through this list again to see if  
16          anyone who I mentioned before happens to have popped back in.  
17          Mr. Phil Healey? Phil Healey? Just making sure. Steve Silver?  
18          Daniel Karpen? You're Daniel Karpen?

19          MR. KARPEN: Yes.

20          EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Mike Fichtelman is not  
21          here. Ghenya Grant? Okay. Daniel Karpen. Mr. Karpen, you can  
22          hand the testimony in, we'll pass it down. Thank you, Mr.  
23          Karpen. Please take a seat over there. Thank you.

24          MR. KARPEN: My name is Daniel Karpen. I'm a registered  
25          professional engineer in New York State. I reside at 3 Harbor

1 Hill Drive, Huntington, New York.

2 I suffered due to the storm. I was out of electricity 13  
3 and a half days, phone service 23 days because, when the tree on  
4 my property fell across the power lines, it also snapped my  
5 phone lines, so I had no phone.

6 I was on the roof at 5:30 on Monday afternoon repairing a  
7 hole in the roof where water was beginning to come through. I  
8 finally got the temporary patch in place and was able to repair  
9 my roof a few days later at a cost of \$16 for a bucket of tar,  
10 flat roof ranch.

11 I'm a professional engineer. I was a stockholder in Long  
12 Island Lighting Company and back in 1994, after Early, who was  
13 president, resigned from the company. So at the stockholder's  
14 meeting, somebody asked, what happened to Anthony Early? And  
15 Dr. Canasino said, he resigned. He took another job. Hired a  
16 headhunter and I'm going to look for a new president.

17 So I decided, a bell rang off in my head. I decided, now  
18 I'll try for the president of Long Island Lighting Company which  
19 I did. I said I would report of what I would do if I was new  
20 president of the company. I would hire a vegetarian chef to  
21 work in a public cafeteria to get rid of the obesity problem. I  
22 would have a fleet of electric vehicle or hybrid vehicles and I  
23 would have a LILCO, find the rotten pole sweepstakes contest so  
24 that people can report rotten poles to LILCO. You have it in  
25 front of you, I don't have to read it. And why do I wear wooden

1 shoes, to kick the LILCO poles to find the rotten ones. I used  
2 to wear them to Dr. Canasino to get them to replace their rotted  
3 poles. In fact, some of them actually did get replaced as a  
4 result of my letters. One of which was written in Morse Code,  
5 then they had the fun of translating it.

6 So, anyway, what I've done in the last couple of days, I  
7 was reading that LIPA doesn't have enough trustees. So I went  
8 to the governor and I applied to be a trustee of the Long Island  
9 Lighting Company -- I mean, of LIPA.

10 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Mr. Karpen, can you wrap up  
11 your testimony quickly, please?

12 MR. KARPEN: Yes. And then I mailed down to the governor  
13 in place of the standard resumé. I mailed him a copy of my  
14 report prepared in 1994 to -- when I was applied for the job of  
15 president of the Long Island Lighting Company and I have a new  
16 800 report, 1-800, duh-LILCO.

17 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you very much for  
18 your testimony, Mr. Karpen. Greg Fisher.

19 MR. FISHER: Tough act to follow. My name is Greg Fisher  
20 and I am an electric board member of Americans for Legal Reform.  
21 I also have three degrees in business, a lot of experience in  
22 economics, business, strategic planning.

23 The problem here is structural with LIPA. We've proven  
24 this with the 25-year experiment that appointed trustees do not  
25 work. I recently filed multiple lawsuits to attempt to force

1 the election of LIPA trustees, as it was originally written in  
2 the original LIPA law. That law passed with home rule approval.  
3 It was completely according to -- the repeal in 1995 was illegal  
4 and did not contain home rule approval.

5 This structural defect could be fixed immediately in LIPA  
6 by the consent of either Mr. Mangano or Mr. Bellone or the  
7 governor to consent to the litigation such that we can have a  
8 reform, an instant reform of this and we can have oversight.

9 The problem is, LIPA is a headless beast of its eight  
10 sitting trustees. Two are expired, the others are complicit in  
11 much malfeasance, some of those issues in my 450 page federal  
12 brief, well worthy of prosecutorial oversight, which there's  
13 wrongful death documented as well that predates Sandy, that  
14 predates Irene.

15 I actually ran on a platform for Riverhead Town Supervisor  
16 a couple years back to take Riverhead off the LIPA system, to  
17 have its own municipal power authority, looking at Greenport,  
18 Freeport and Rockville Centre as a model.

19 I believe that elected trustees put in under the original  
20 LIPA plan that would be regional would look at them for the best  
21 interest of those local areas, and, therefore, I would imagine  
22 they would push for competition. I would imagine they would  
23 push for more municipal power authorities.

24 What's really important about municipal power authorities  
25 and local control is, Long Island is a very long place. I

1 campaigned for first senate district. It's very long. There's  
2 different weather problems in different areas as we experienced  
3 with this storm and different costs. Riverhead, a million and a  
4 half. 600 million in Brookhaven. I think that was number, but  
5 some really big number. So you have to break it up. It can't  
6 be managed centrally. It's impossible.

7 So my message is simply that competition, the opportunity  
8 for local power authorities that can all come through a consent  
9 so that we can have elected trustees, that could come overnight.  
10 It wouldn't have to wait for the final determination of the  
11 panel. It is to follow the law. The law was broken in this  
12 repealer. You can correct this. Thank you very much.

13 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you for your  
14 testimony. Superintendent Lawsky, that is it for our speakers  
15 this evening. Thank you.

16 MR. FISHER: Mr. Lewis was also on the list but he's a  
17 co-candidate and an energy expert. He was a co-candidate in  
18 this petition for elected trustees.

19 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Okay, thank you. But,  
20 Supervisor Lawsky, that's it for our speakers this evening.  
21 Thank you.

22 MR. LEWIS: I believe I'm being discriminated against.

23 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: No, no. Actually, did you  
24 sign up?

25 MR. LEWIS: Of course I did, before him.

1 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Well, then please sit down.  
2 Your name's not on the list.

3 MR. LEWIS: You must have known that I was coming.

4 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: So please say your name and  
5 your affiliation.

6 MR. LEWIS: My name is Roger Scott Lewis. I'm a member of  
7 the Democratic Committee at Southampton. I also run a green  
8 technology company called ITM. I'm going to give you my opening  
9 statement, more background on the green technology company and  
10 the reasons for my opening statement.

11 I want to make my point and then I'm going give you the  
12 benefit. I object to the Moreland Commission. Why? Because  
13 you represent one person. And I move to change the venue to the  
14 federal court.

15 However, since the public needs to understand that there is  
16 an alternative to this commission, I am going to continue to  
17 address restructuring and monopolies.

18 All right. Last of all, as Greg mentioned, we ran around,  
19 got 600 signatures and petitioned, filed valid petitions to  
20 become trustees of LIPA through an election process. The board  
21 of elections didn't do their job, so consequently we sued them  
22 and that case is still ongoing.

23 Our founding fathers understood that one individual is  
24 unable to make a -- a political decision, so they invented the  
25 election process and the jury. This is the wrong venue for this

1 very important energy matter, because you are part of the  
2 monopoly or the problem. 20 percent of the utility bills go to  
3 the government, the state and local government.

4 So here's a little piece from the sermon on the mound:

5 "Judge not that you not be judged for with that judgment you  
6 judge you will be judged and, with the measure you use, it will  
7 be measured back to you, and while you look at the spec in your  
8 brother's eye, but do not consider the plank in your own eye and  
9 look, a plank is in your own eye, hypocrite. First remove the  
10 plank from your own eye and then you will see clearly to remove  
11 the spec from your brother's eye. The point is, consent to the  
12 election of LIPA trustees, the benefit will be -- oh, and a  
13 point of information, the utilities were deregulated in 1999.  
14 There is no more monopoly. You sold it to National Grid. It's  
15 an open competitive field. That's why I'm in the business  
16 because I compete against them, but I'm not going to go into the  
17 football drama that I have going on with the utilities at this  
18 point because I'm out of time.

19 So that benefit is competition, transparency, have the  
20 elections. Thank you very much for your patience and your time.

21 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you. Superintendent  
22 Lawsky, I now believe that that is the final list of speakers.

23 CO-CHAIR LAWSKY: Well, thank you everyone for being here  
24 tonight. Very very interesting testimony not only from our  
25 witnesses but also from the public. It's good to hear from all

1 sides of this issue and the issues we're looking at.

2 This Moreland Commission obviously takes its work  
3 incredibly seriously and I want to especially thank, because I  
4 didn't get a chance to before, my co-chairman Bob Abrams, who is  
5 the former Attorney General of this state, one of the great  
6 leaders of our generation in New York, and just a great  
7 co-chairman of this commission. I don't know if you want to say  
8 some closing remarks as well.

9 CO-CHAIR ABRAMS: I'll rest on your comments.

10 CO-CHAIR LAWSKY: I didn't have a biblical quote,  
11 unfortunately. So thank you all and we are adjourned.

12 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR CALCATERRA: Thank you.

13 (Conclusion of public comment before the Commissioners.  
14 Continuing and further comments follows.)

15 MR. PERLMUTTER: Let's go over complaints.

16 Number one was the way people were treated that came here  
17 to help. It turns out that a lot of the people that were hired  
18 by LIPA from out of state couldn't work because they were being  
19 extorted money from the unions. So we have a problem there.  
20 The people weren't allowed to go to work if they didn't join the  
21 union temporarily. Pay union dues, pension, money benefits.  
22 That was written in Newsday. Whose going to come to Long Island  
23 the next time we have a storm to help? I think it's kind of  
24 evident that any type of disaster like this we can't help  
25 ourselves.

1           We need the whole country to help us. And if these people  
2           don't want to come here because they were getting extorted from,  
3           we treat them like garbage, they're not going to come back.  
4           That's the number one problem.

5           Number two problem is communication. We should be told  
6           what the game plan is. Certain areas may be taken care of  
7           first. Fine. But at least people can make other plans, know to  
8           leave if they're going to be stuck for two weeks without power  
9           instead of waiting around being told every two or three days  
10          they will be getting power back.

11          Another problem is I live in Oceanside and apparently we  
12          protested. And the minute we got done protesting, which was  
13          November 9th, power was restored to two-thirds of the people who  
14          didn't have power in Oceanside. And that can't possibly be that  
15          they just happen to coincidentally fix it. So that's telling me  
16          one of two things. One, either they were afraid to turn the  
17          power on because it was going to start fires and they may be  
18          legally responsible for it. Or two, they were just overwhelmed  
19          with the work and didn't want to turn people on at the same  
20          time. Which makes no sense.

21          Another problem that I saw is that the politicians are  
22          letting everybody down. What I mean by that is, people on Long  
23          Island went through a terrible storm, have terrible damages and  
24          they're getting charged exorbitant fees to remove trees, put  
25          boilers in. They were requested to have electricians go to

1 their houses, in areas that weren't flooded, with no water  
2 damages, and pay these electricians exorbitant amounts of money  
3 to just say nothing's wrong. What do people want? These people  
4 are still getting ripped off and the politicians are not  
5 helping. Every level of politician.

6 Another thing was, when we were told we needed electricians  
7 we called up the company to inspect us and they never returned  
8 the phone call. It was whoever, the Town of Hempstead or Nassau  
9 County, signed on the deal that it wouldn't cost us anything.  
10 My sister-in-law made an appointment with them and they never  
11 showed up.

12 Another problem is, one of my neighbors works for the Town  
13 of Hempstead as a carpenter. I think Nassau County or Town of  
14 Hempstead, I'm not sure. After the storm, instead of being told  
15 to cut down trees, which is what he does for a living, he's a  
16 carpenter, he uses saws, they had him decorating Halloween for  
17 kids. They couldn't believe it. All these carpenters were  
18 sitting there setting up Halloween parties in halls when they  
19 could have been out there cutting trees, getting people out and  
20 helping.

21 Basically, that's the main gist of everything. There are  
22 so many things to go over that I can't possibly go over with.  
23 That's what I would like to say.

24 MR. FICHTELMAN: Short list of concerns: Failure of  
25 local, county, state, and federal government officials to

1 adequately prepare for a storm of this magnitude; it is much  
2 less costly to put adequate infrastructure in place than to  
3 repair/rebuild an inadequate one.

4 Failure of local, county, state and federal government  
5 officials to adequately respond to the storm; there was much  
6 pointing of fingers, but poor coordination and communication,  
7 and slow action.

8 Failure of LIPA officials to adequately prepare for and  
9 respond to a storm of this magnitude; it took two weeks to  
10 restore power to Lido Dunes, longer for other parts of the  
11 barrier island.

12 Failure of Verizon and other telecom officials to  
13 adequately prepare for and respond to a storm of this magnitude;  
14 landline support was nonexistent and cell coverage was grossly  
15 inadequate.

16 Failure of local, county, state and federal healthcare  
17 officials to adequately prepare for and respond to a storm of  
18 this magnitude; it is much less costly to put adequate  
19 infrastructure in place than to repair/rebuild an inadequate  
20 one. LBMC is still closed, limited emergency care, 1.5 months  
21 after the storm.

22 Failure of local, county, state and federal education  
23 officials to adequately prepare for and respond to a storm of  
24 this magnitude; many schools on the south shore remain closed.  
25 Student class size has doubled in many cases, leaving affected

1 students at an educational disadvantage (not to mention  
2 emotional and social impacts). Libraries, computers and other  
3 resources destroyed and unavailable.

4 A bright spot - local first responders, such as the PLLFD,  
5 provided leadership and support for the community. They need  
6 better funding and support to be prepared for the next  
7 emergency.

8 Concerns about funding and insurance claim delays for  
9 repairs, tax treatment for uninsured damage.

10 Failure of county officials to adequately prepare for and  
11 respond to sewage treatment plant outage. For example, raw  
12 sewage shunted to Reynolds Channel and open ocean. Heating oil  
13 and other toxins flowing into sewers, et cetera. One of many  
14 reflections of short-term thinking and poor planning.

15 Poor management of massive garbage and toxic waste,  
16 destroyed cars - huge trucks at high speeds moving garbage to  
17 Lido West and Nickerson beaches, only to move it back to oil  
18 city for shipment on barges (issues of hazardous objects falling  
19 onto roadbed, traffic, safety, noise, air quality, road surface  
20 damage, et cetera). One of many reflections of short-term  
21 thinking and poor planning.

22 Millions of dollars has gone into Emergency Management  
23 since 9/11. Public safety and bay constables to be ready for  
24 another attack on a bigger scale. What does this show for how  
25 officials invested these dollars? What lessons have been

1 learned and what will you do differently?

2 MS. GRANT: My name is Ghenya Grant. I am a Suffolk  
3 County resident within the Town of Babylon, and more  
4 specifically Wyandanch.

5 I would like to thank the Commission for an opportunity to  
6 express my experiences and concerns over the LIPA response, and  
7 would have liked to address the Commission in person; however,  
8 time does not permit.

9 My remarks specifically pertain to the communication  
10 failure. Also damage reporting as well as coordination with  
11 local agencies in priority of restoration service. I was  
12 without power for approximately two weeks, and during that time,  
13 initially we reported damage being a downed wire in the area.  
14 That we were told was an impediment to us receiving service.

15 Firstly, there was no response indicating that our  
16 complaint had been received, which is troubling, because not  
17 only was it an impediment to us receiving service as a dangerous  
18 and hazardous condition, we had no way of knowing whether or not  
19 LIPA received the complaint, was working on repairing the wire,  
20 or if there was another plan that was underway.

21 Aside from that, we had no way of knowing when our power  
22 would be restored and what would be -- what was being worked on.  
23 Most frustrating for residents was the fact that we had no  
24 concept of what areas were or were not priority and did not  
25 receive and did not see visible signs of work crews in our area.

1 That did not mean that they were not necessarily working;  
2 however, I think that the priority plan needs to be evaluated so  
3 that residents know where they fall in the priority.

4 Lastly, the public library, which I also sit on the board  
5 as a trustee, was not restored until practically two weeks  
6 later. And we, as a public agency that's chartered by the State  
7 Board of Regents, had no way of knowing or telling our residents  
8 when power would be restored.

9 Thank you.

10 MR. GENDRON: The telecom industry is going through  
11 changes in how it delivers its services to the residents of New  
12 York. While change is inevitable, that does not mean it's going  
13 in the right direction. This storm and its impact on all of us  
14 has shown that we must demand better service of our telecom and  
15 cable providers. We can no longer accept going forward the  
16 isolation that we experienced because these companies chose to  
17 leave us out in the cold because it would cut into corporate  
18 profits.

19 There should be a copper cable network to emergency  
20 services to ensure that they have a means to be reached and to  
21 communicate with one another, regardless of what happens to  
22 local power.

23 Verizon should be made to address the double pole issue  
24 with the other utilities so they do not serve to exacerbate the  
25 problem of bringing down the network that serves our telecom and

1 cable services.

2 The time is now, while these experiences are still fresh in  
3 our minds, to go back to Verizon and all of the cable companies  
4 to fix this and provide a more secure service that the residents  
5 of New York can rely on in times of natural emergencies. It is  
6 also time for the PSC to get back to ensuring certain service  
7 standards and plant conditions. If competition can't ensure  
8 this, then regulation can. It did before and it certainly can  
9 do it again.

10 Thank you.

11 MR. FLAHERTY: My legal name is Dennis Flaherty. I am a  
12 Chief Electrical Inspector. I go under the name, it's really  
13 Dennis J. Flaherty, 266 Keswick Drive, East Islip, New York,  
14 11730. I began testifying downstairs. I am an electrical  
15 inspector, and I was talking about my experience with doing  
16 these electrical inspections. I talked about Freeport, how  
17 everything was organized and doing very well.

18 However, when it came to LIPA territory, the inspections  
19 themselves, the implementation of the inspections themselves was  
20 turned over to the towns and the villages, and how much of a  
21 disaster it was at that time because the towns and the villages  
22 didn't have any plan how we spent time. Just watching the towns  
23 and village employees jockeying for position, more or less.

24 How during these inspections, a lot of times, we were  
25 called off the actual grid type of inspection, block by block

1 inspections, to go to inspections at politician's places. Like  
2 I was called off to do an inspection in a councilman's friend's  
3 house and a Judge. A lot of our time was wasted doing this  
4 rather than going to back to doing these.

5 The idea of the inspections was to safeguard the home,  
6 prevent fires and everything else. During my inspections in  
7 Freeport, I did see a number of fires, small fires that were  
8 caused by the salt water infiltration of the electrical system.  
9 They didn't amount to anything because the wood and the  
10 combustible material was wet, so the fires didn't go anywhere.

11 But in my course of work since then, I have had a number of  
12 electricians tell me that they have witnessed the same thing,  
13 different types of fires, small fires, electrical fires. And  
14 what I am concerned with is the Suffolk County in particular  
15 having the power turned on without these inspections, and I'm  
16 even more concerned with what is going to happen when this wood  
17 does dry out, and energy is turned on.

18 Today, we heard in the early morning that the Knights of  
19 Columbus in Long Beach went on fire, the inside of it. Although  
20 they didn't really determine the cause of the fire, today it is  
21 very suspicious that the Knights of Columbus was flooded with  
22 water, and the electricity was turned on. I am very suspicious  
23 that the cause of that fire was the electrical wiring and the  
24 salt infiltrations.

25 I read in the newspaper that the town officials were going

1 to electricians asking them what they thought about it, rather  
2 than going to building inspectors, electrical inspectors or even  
3 testing laboratories. So that is a concern of mine. My big  
4 concern today is the buildings that do have power turned on but  
5 not inspected. I think that they have to be addressed somehow,  
6 and I wish that the news media would take a little notice of  
7 this and get a little more involved rather than spending all  
8 their time just bashing LIPA.

9 (Whereupon, the Moreland Commission hearing concluded at  
10 9:18 p.m.)

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C E R T I F I C A T E

WE, EDWARD LETO, FRANK GRAY, LINDA SCHILT, ROBERT J. POLLACK, Shorthand Reporters and Notaries Public in and for the State of New York, do hereby state:

THAT we attended at the time and place above mentioned and took stenographic record of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter;

THAT the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate transcript of the same and the whole thereof, according to the best of our abilities and beliefs.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hand this 17th day of December, 2012.



*Edward Leto*

EDWARD LETO

*Frank Gray*

FRANK GRAY

*Linda Schilt*

LINDA SCHILT

*Robert J. Pollack*

ROBERT J. POLLACK